

feeling on the subject as others, which is not an inference true or false, but something so involved in the mode of our receiving the sensations, that to have the sensations is to believe not in them only, but in their external causes, nor is it easy to conceive of such an invariable effect, in all minds, being delusive and unreliable. But whatever may be said of the external causes, the existence of the sensations is undeniable, and to experience them is to believe them, there being no place for any evidence on the subject. It may be said that we are deceived even in our sensations, having afterwards, if not at the moment, full assurance that certain supposed perceptions of our organs of sense were not to be trusted; or, if we remain under the delusion, it being fully known to others that we are misled, so that a reasonable man would not rely too firmly even on the evidence of sense. There is some truth in this, yet not so as to invalidate our previous statement respecting our belief in our sensations. The mental states so termed, arise out of states of certain nerves, which states convey to us the notion of real things, existing independently of us, and becoming, by their means, known to us. But there is another class of mental states, distinguished by many philosophers as *ideas*—that term being used as contrasted with *sensations*—the connection of which with affections of the nervous system may also be well proved, and which appear really to differ from sensations chiefly in the degree of vividness of the nervous action. Now it is an ascertained fact that, under the influence of disease, producing abnormal excitement of the nervous system, or some part of it, these ideas may have, to the individual experiencing them, all the force of sensations, so that he receives them as such, or, in other words, believes in the reality of what is thus brought before his mind. It is from other persons in full health being in a position to receive the same sensations, and not receiving them, or from their comparison with facts well known to great numbers, that we are assured that what the individual supposes himself to perceive has no reality, and that he is under the influence of disease, which may amount to madness, or may be only partial, connected with disorder of a particular organ, and of such kind that the patient, though believing in the false sensations for the moment, can convince himself of their real nature, and correct, by his judgment, the delusion to which he has been subject. There is also another class of deceptions, usually regarded as deceptions of the senses, but really consisting in so strong an