

*Subjective Senses of the "Heart" in Activity.*

The subjective feelings of the Heart are distinguished by great desire or aversion, and may be gratified either directly or responsively.

Gratification by response is by no means confined to feelings of mere aversion. For instance, the subjective feeling of love is aroused in a young man by the amiable qualities of a young lady. The sense itself is pleasing; and the young man, for the sake of that alone, may wish for the continuance of the exciting character or relation. This would be direct gratification. But the desire attending love is strong, and its impulse may lead him to seek to change the relation of the exciting object into that of the marriage state. This would be gratification by response.

Again, the relation of beneficence, in which a person has revealed himself to me, may excite my gratitude. The relation of the person in the excitant, in this case also, is pleasing enough; but yet the impulse of desire attending the feeling prompts me to change this relation, and make him that was the giver the recipient of my gratitude.

Neither of the subjective senses referred to here is a feeling of aversion.

Again, feelings of aversion may sometimes be gratified in a like manner by relations of an averted character. My anger may be aroused by the knowledge that a person has injured me. The impulse or aversion of the sense, in this case, would be gratified by placing the offender in relations of vindiction or revenge. This is the natural impulse of the feeling, though I may have grace enough to master it.

Horror, again, as a different example, is a feeling partaking much of pain. The gratifying relation, or character, in this case, is like that of mere pain or pleasure—the change of the object responsively into non-exciting relations or character.

These cases illustrate the working of these subjective feelings, and also show that responsive gratification is not always confined to feelings of aversion.

All these subjective feelings, except the Permanent, subside or abate on gratification—that is, they appease by putting the object into gratifying character or relations. When, however, we speak of certain subjective senses being permanent, we do not mean that they are at all times alike active. Avarice, pride, ambition, etc., are all feelings of this class; and yet, though generally active in some natures, this does not imply that they may not be capable of special stimulation and gratification by the presentation of exciting or gratifying relations to them. Indeed, all subjective senses of the "Heart" may be called occasional; only some of them may be so predominantly and persistently active in certain natures, as very properly to justify the application of the word "permanent" to them.

Love for an individual, for example, represents a class which might be called permanent. Love in the heart of a young man, once fairly excited, for the young woman who afterwards becomes his wife, may continue active so long as he lives; yet it will have its occasions of special stimulation and gratification.

If the feeling lasts but for a few months, it may be called either occasional, as compared with the more enduring feelings; or permanent, as compared with the more evanescent. It is scarcely necessary to say here, that every subjective feeling in a state of activity and impulse is a Propensity.

We have referred, heretofore, very fully, to the service which the imagination renders in pointing out or suggesting to the mind the various relations, or characters, in which the subjective feelings may be gratified. We may add again here, that though the imagination cannot produce the relation, or character, which may gratify the senses, it can produce fictitious conceptions of these relations, or characters, which, by reasoning, we find out the means of reducing to verities; and these verities then gratify the senses. The imagination thus, while it stimulates the feeling, flashes up before the mind at the same time certain fictitious relations of gratification, which reason contrives to realize. Thus, if a person is animated by revenge, his imagination conceives of certain methods in which his revenge may be gratified. At last a method is conceived of, which his reason perceives a way of realizing; and he finally is gratified by making the fancy of his mind a verity in experience.

Many subjective feelings of this class (of the Heart), in common with others, have a marked tendency to associate with, or to produce excitement in, others: for instance, scorn associates with contempt; love, with admiration and esteem: anger excites revenge; hate excites scorn or contempt; curiosity, impatience, etc.

The other peculiarities of this class of subjective senses, or feelings, are added in the accompanying Synoptical Table. (See Table B.) We have not sought to reduce analytically these feelings to the fewest number; for in so doing we should eliminate some compounds which are now generally regarded as simple elements. We trust the Table will be of more service as it is. All the subjective feelings of the heart are not to be supposed to be contained in the Table.