

Easing the pace

concerned. In other words, such Canadian measures would have no concrete — or instrumental — effect on the structures of institutionalized racism. They would not cause those in South Africa committed to the maintenance of those structures to abandon them, and would be unlikely to cause other governments whose concrete interests commit them to normal relations with Pretoria to adopt sanctionist positions. Moreover, the single grand gesture, eliminating as it does all the non-violent tools of coercion from one's repertoire in one stroke, reduces Canadian options considerably, for the only other guns left to fire are the real variety.

The Mulroney government rejected this approach in 1985, and in the years since. It opted instead for a coercive approach to sanctions that was marked by a step-by-step, gradualist policy of both applying hurtful or disruptive measures, and threatening to increase the hurts if South African behavior did not change. In particular, both Mulroney and Clark held out the "grand gestures" — terminating diplomatic relations and imposing a total trade ban — as threats that they would have no difficulty im-

plementing at some point in the future. The government also proceeded on the assumption that Canada, acting alone, has less capacity to hurt South Africa economically than if the actions were multilateral. Thus emphasis was placed on trying to secure multilateral support for the threat, or imposition, of such hurtful measures, particularly in the Commonwealth and at the Economic Summit.

When it doesn't work

However, embracing the instrumental purposes of sanctions against South Africa, and thereby rejecting the symbolic approach, brings with it a particular logic that forces the sanctioner to confront the consequences of his sanctions on the behavior of the target. In particular, what happens when the hurtful measures imposed — and those other hurts promised for the future — do not have the intended effect of changing South African behavior? The logic of gradualist coercion requires new sanctions and new threats. In other words, faced with intransigence, the logic suggests a 3-fold response: (1) the maintenance of the original measures; (2) the imposition of previously threatened measures; and (3) threats of new hurtful measures that would follow if the target failed to comply. If one starts the sanctioning process with a large number of possible hurtful measures, one can go through this cycle several times against a strong or intransigent adversary who refuses to change his behavior. And indeed this is precisely what the Mulroney government has been through, as each attempt to use hurts, imposed or threatened, to move Pretoria has met with little but scorn and intransigence.

There are, however, limits to the gradualist cycle. The first is that one's repertoire of hurtful but non-violent measures is in fact finite. Between 1985 and 1988, Canada invoked well over twenty-five different measures designed either to hurt South Africa or to weaken the structures of apartheid, the last one being a tightening of the ban on sports contacts in August 1988. To be sure, the bag of possible hurtful measures is not yet empty. For example, Ottawa could impose a complete ban on travel by Canadian citizens to South Africa and a concomitant ban on the admission of South Africans to Canada, or an embargo on all telephone, mail and telecommunications traffic to and from South Africa over which Ottawa has control. It could pass legislation requiring any public institution receiving federal funds, directly or indirectly, to adhere to the same internal purchasing rules now applied to the federal government; or refuse to engage in contract work of any sort with Canadian firms or multinationals with indirect holdings in South Africa. Or, using the well-worn Canadian technique of imposing taxes on things considered sinful, Ottawa could institute a special "anti-apartheid" surtax, levied through the personal income tax system, on dividends received from Canadian (and even foreign) firms operating directly or indirectly in South Africa (the proceeds from which would be directly added to the embassy-administered Canada Fund in Pretoria).

It could also make good on its promise to embrace the "grand gestures" — the termination of diplomatic relations or total trade sanctions. But if the South African government remained steadfast in the face of these or other Canadian measures — and there is no evidence to suggest that it would not — eventually Canada would simply run out of hurtful measures that did not involve the encouragement of violence or the use of force itself. The logic of coercion draws the sanctionist inexorably to violent measures when non-violent measures fail to coerce.

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