

not be done without Soviet troops and is likely to take a long time. In these circumstances the Soviets can hardly be seriously interested in proposals for the neutrality of Afghanistan, if they require Soviet withdrawal. On the other hand, the West can certainly not accept what the Soviets would like, which is an end to all interference in Afghanistan except Soviet intervention, followed by an international guarantee of the Afghanistan government, which would put a Western seal of approval on the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul.

There are in my view only two ways which are likely to bring the Soviets to consider withdrawal seriously. One is the provision of sufficient assistance to the national resistance forces in Afghanistan to make the Soviet pacification campaign too costly, politically and militarily. The other is the development of sufficient criticism among the non-aligned countries to persuade the Soviets that Afghanistan is not worth the attendant loss of influence in the Third World. It is not yet clear whether one or other of these factors will materialize.

#### Western solidarity

Meanwhile, Western policy should be directed toward condemning the Soviet use of force, calling for Soviet withdrawal and seeking a guarantee against the repetition of such aggression. To back such policy up it is important for us to reinforce and modernize our defences. At the same time it is important to avoid a return to the Cold War and to retain those elements of our relations with the Soviet Union (and even more so our relations with the Eastern Europe) which are demonstrably in the Western interest. We must try to strike a balance between signaling the dangerous strains created by the Soviet action and continuing the East-West dialogue. We should be ready, for example, to talk about the further development of the detente process under proper circumstances and about measures to prevent nuclear confrontation.

Finally, it is important to do all we can to harmonize the Western and Third World reactions to the Afghanistan crisis. For this we must be ready for long and patient efforts to persuade the non-aligned countries of the significance of the Soviet invasion and to encourage their participation in the search for a solution. In this connection a resolution of the Iran hostage question and some form of rapprochement between Iran and the United States seem to be indispensable elements. And that, of course, is why the hostage drama, in addition to its humanitarian aspects, is at once so fateful and so excruciating.

Under the sober impact of events in Iran and Afghanistan the United States has been going through a process of re-appraising its role as a superpower and as leader of the free world, with implications for all of us. No one should underestimate the traumatic effects on the United States of the long, agonizing war in Vietnam. It sapped not only American blood and resources

but also much of the United States' political will and sense of purpose. Never before had a foreign war so rent the fabric of American society and American political life and brought home too starkly the lessons of the limits of power. But the trauma of Vietnam and the partial paralysis it caused is receding, and much of President Carter's new assertiveness is due to a renewed sense of determination on the part of the American people and a greater willingness to exercise their leadership role.

To the extent that this means a more realistic approach to the task of maintaining the balance of power on which the peace and security of all of us depend, it is certainly to be welcomed. At the same time, leadership is not enough without solidarity, and solidarity requires a sharing of purposes and tasks. The interests at stake in the questions examined above are common interests because they are vital to the survival of our free societies. That many of them lie outside the NATO area of course poses an additional problem of co-ordination. In my opinion the solution is not to be sought in an extension of the Treaty area but rather in a pragmatic division of labour among the Allies according to their respective positions and capabilities.

There is therefore more than ever a need for solidarity among friends and allies; it must be our highest priority. But perceptions can be different even when interests are basically the same. The fact that Americans and not Europeans are being held hostage in Iran means that the emotional involvement on the two sides of the Atlantic is different. And the fact that the United States is in North America and the Europeans share a continent with the Soviet Union also causes a difference of perceptions. When combined with different political systems and habits of thoughts it carries the constant danger of divergence which adversaries are quick to exploit. Solidarity therefore calls for careful reflection before acting and for close and continuing communications, especially between the North American and European members of the Atlantic Alliance. It also calls for heightened sensitivity on the part of all of us—a conscious effort by each of us to put himself in the other's shoes. Both our domestic procedures and our multilateral mechanisms of consultation must be geared to this requirement.

Against this background there is a requirement, in my view, for a re-examination of relations between Europe and North America. One of the practical implications of interdependence in the 1980s is that Europe, and particularly the Federal Republic of Germany, is bound to be called on to shoulder more responsibility as a major partner in the free world. This is a natural consequence of Western Europe's growing economic, political and military integration and a reflection of the Community's increasing weight in world affairs. It suggests that the Community should in turn be taking a new look at its relationship with North America, not