Maritime Code

ping industry. I am sure the minister is quite prepared to go along with this.

There is a further caveat we should like to place on the record at this point. It has to do with my concern about the process of exemptions from the provisions of this bill. There are one or two clauses the purpose and intent of which we are not certain about. If I were to be partisan, I might say that they are to permit the polar icebreakers of the United States coastguard to go into the Arctic and transport, lead or escort massive tankers from the slopes of Alaska out through the Northwest Passage and down to the great ports off the New Jersey coast. This is being contemplated. I am not a partisan person when it comes to maritime activity, so I simply ask the minister, at some point in time in committee, or preferably this afternoon, to expand slightly on the opting out sections of this code. I ask this because I think the minister would readily agree that the exemptions in the past were granted on a sort of wholesale basis. It has been virtually a rubber stamp process for the CTC, and we would like to see this come to an end.

• (1500)

In a general way we are also concerned with the ad hoc approach to transportation in Canada. The movement of goods and passengers is a mode of transportation with which we are concerned. In two or three years' time when we complete the transportation overhaul we might end up with conflicts if not in practice at least in philosophy, and this might lead to difficulties. While we are a little bit concerned with the ad hoc approach I hasten to add that it is better than no action at all. At first blush I think it serves the shipping community reasonably well.

It is what this bill does not do that concerns me in a personal way. It says nothing about the need for a Canadian flag fleet for international seaborne trade. It says nothing about the Canadian army. As I understood it, what Mr. Darling was doing was in preparation for the rebirth of Canada's international marine fleet, which would put us in a strong, secure position with respect to the extractive industries of the north in those waters north of 63 degrees. It would be a mistake for the government not to secure the extractive industries in the north exclusively to Canadian ships, built in Canada to Canadian standards, crewed by Canadians, and subject to Canadian law.

I spoke of this matter last night with the parliamentary secretary, and I see that the minister is here this afternoon. I hope he will take my suggestion with respect to the north seriously. I do not suggest that the government is not concerned about this, and I do not suggest that we are not aware of the difficulty. As a matter of fact there is nothing in the north to take out right now, but in anticipation of what is there, the natural gas, the iron ore, the lead, I think we have a responsibility to indicate to the shipping community at home and abroad that it should develop the necessary technology and capacity to send our ships north of sixty.

There are one or two other reservations that we will deal with in committee, such as the substantive conditions of the code starting at page 12 and wandering through to page 16 or 17. We also want to look at the regulations. My colleague, the hon. member for Esquimalt-Saanich (Mr. [Mr. Forrestall.]

Munro), will raise a question with respect to the opting out clause and its impact on the carrying of passengers on foreign ships between one Canadian port and another.

I come back to what concerns me more than anything else with respect to this bill, although I believe it is not within the capacity of the maritime code to deal with the remarks I want to leave on the record. I will be very critical with respect to the books that are to follow this first book of the general maritime code. I am concerned with the ownership of vessels and the fact that shipping procedures are rapidly changing, increasing the cost of shipbuilding and fleet operation. This has driven many small firms out of business leaving control in fewer and fewer hands, technically known as monopoly situations.

Not only that, but governments around the world have begun to look again at the century old subsidization policies. Instead of of shelling out public funds with no strings attached, they say, "We want control of your business, we want men on your boards, we want voting shares in your companies". So the foreign fleets upon which Canada is totally dependent are increasingly the arms and tools of the express national interests of foreign powers. Mr. Darling suggests that Canada cannot safely rely forever on the whims of foreign governments for the vitally important shipment of Canadian exports and imports.

Remember here that about \$8 billion worth of Canadian goods were sold abroad last year and about \$7 billion worth of foreign goods were brought into Canada, and not so much as 1 per cent of this enormous total was carried in ships over which Canada has legislative control. If even a portion of Canadian imports and exports were to be crippled by a decision of offshore interests, the resulting financial and economic chaos would be staggering.

Standing alone between Canada and this unthinkable situation, protecting this vital trade, are the foreign shipping cartels, responsible to Athens, London, New York, Tokyo, Amsterdam, not Ottawa, completely beyond the reach of Canadian law and even specially exempt from it. They serve us well today, Mr. Darling suggests, but they might not even be here tomorrow.

He points to the growing trend of the South American governments to insist that all trade to and from those countries be carried in their national bottoms. He points out the increasing number of bilateral arrangements between even great "free trade" proponents like the United States, enacted with no regard whatsoever for third parties such as Canada. He points to the diminishing ports of call brought about by containerization, and wonders where Canada will stand at the next notch in the ever-advancing development of ship technology. He points out that with all the federal and provincial money spent at Port Hawkesbury, St. Romuald, and Come-By-Chance, no one had the initiative or the foresight to require any type of shipping clause to protect some percentage of the traffic for Canadian ships. This is what we are hitting at.

We have closed the gulf but we have not closed north of sixty. Why? Even if the legislative process takes some time, let us tell the world that we intend to do it, and not spend 20 years in the doing of it. Nothing was done with respect to Come-By-Chance, for example. The principle is that first in will get the business, and keep it. Who is