

improve it and to make it more effective. Indeed, one of the proudest records of Canada's post-World War II foreign policy has been its continuing support of the ideals embodied in the United Nations charter and its practical help in assisting the United Nations in coping with the practical problems it has faced. I doubt if any other country has a more impressive, continuous, sustained record of support for the ideas and ideals of the United Nations than Canada. But I do not think it is enough to be sympathetic and concerned about the United Nations. We must also be very realistic about what this institution can do in international affairs and about its possibilities of development.

• (4:50 p.m.)

To understand these possibilities and the hope that the future gives us, I think we must really look at the United Nations in the context of its history. It will be no surprise to members of this House when I say that the original, great expectations which were held by many people, particularly in the west, about what the United Nations might become after the war were quickly dashed in the cold war atmosphere that developed over the Polish question and after the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1948.

It has now become somewhat fashionable among the revisionist historians to try to reapportion blame for the events of the cold war. It is not my purpose to get involved in the historical question, yet it is obvious that the hostility, fear, suspicion and mistrust, perhaps inevitable, perhaps unnecessary should have developed in the late 1940s. This shattered the entire base on which the United Nations had been founded, the belief of the great powers that the wartime allies would be able to come together after the war and direct the affairs of mankind in a reasonable fashion. Indeed, one of the lessons that had been learned, it was thought, from the old League of Nations was that there had been too great a dispersal of power to the small and minor nations. That is why the United Nations charter gave to the United Nations power to limit the activities of states so long as they were not great powers, for the essential prerequisite of the United Nations enforcement action was the agreement of the five permanent powers of the Security Council. Of course, that agreement broke down very quickly.

At that stage the United Nations was still relatively small. It did not have well over the 100 members that it now has, with the representation of the third world which Canada worked so hard to get into the United Nations. There was real hope at that stage that the United Nations could be used as an instrument of the powers of the west against the Soviet Union, against one of the members of the Security Council. This was indeed the background to the 1950s and to the United Nations Korean force. Then we saw for a brief time the use of that international institution as a police power against one of the allies of one of its members.

That attempt ultimately broke down. The experience of the Korean effort on the part of the United Nations left the members with the feeling that "whatever else we do in future, we must not again become involved in that

#### *Prevention of Military Aggression*

kind of operation." There was a feeling that if the United Nations was to be used in this way, in a way different from the original premise underlying its foundation, the result would be, inevitably, the withdrawal from the organization of the Communist states and its complete collapse.

The next phase of the United Nations coincided with the entry of a multiplicity of new states, from Africa and Asia particularly. At this stage we had a United Nations assembly which the people in the Security Council, or the great powers, could no longer easily control. The bulk of power, in the sense of voting power, lay with the new nations of the uncommitted world, sometimes called the neutralist world. These powers had problems that were different from the security concerns—perhaps one could say the security obsessions—which influenced the United States and the Soviet Union in their dealings with the United Nations.

These new countries in dealing with the United Nations were mainly concerned with underdevelopment, world poverty, economic difficulties, health organization and colonialism. Those were and are the problems which concern the third world. That essentially is the stage we are still at in the United Nations. It has become an institution which is dominated by the concerns, not of the great powers but of the small powers, the Asian and African powers, those of the third world. As a result of that, the great powers to some extent have lost interest in the United Nations since it is no longer quite as able an instrument for the pursuit of their aims and objectives as it once was.

It is within that context that we have to look at the hon. member's motion, because we have a United Nations which is a forum dominated by the interests of the small and middle powers. Yet the hon. member's suggestions could only become realistically enforced if we were to talk in terms of the United Nations returning to the original concept of the charter, that is, if the United Nations were to become an organization again in which the great powers were able to agree on what they wanted to do and used the United Nations as the instrument for enforcing it.

In other words, we have two conceptions as to how the United Nations could develop. One is that it could develop in the direction of being a world government; the other, that it could develop toward being one instrument—not all the instruments, but simply one instrument—in dealing with international political problems of our world. It would not be the most important, necessarily, but it would become one instrument which would help to bring about a stable balance of peace in the world. It would be a useful institution.

I suggest to the hon. member that the conception which I believe he holds, that of converting the United Nations to a world government, is an unrealistic one. I suggest to him that we should feel no embarrassment in looking at the United Nations simply as a political instrument within the context of international politics. Certainly, we in this House should not be concerned about looking at the United Nations as a political instrument. Sometimes