

*External Affairs*

The minister attempted to explain away for us the statement of the United States Secretary of State, and I wondered whether he had borne in mind the fact that, since he spoke and since Mr. Dulles replied, Mr. Dulles himself had explained away his reaction to the minister's speech in the United States. Presumably we can now expect to have Mr. Dulles again explain away the explanation that was given here in this house last night of his speech. I must congratulate the minister, though, on his skill in dissecting and analysing the meaning of words. I wish that it were possible, by modifying our interpretation of words, necessarily to be able to modify the reality behind those words. But unfortunately we in this world do not fight with semantic weapons. If we did so, let me hasten to assure you, Mr. Speaker, that I would most gladly enlist under the generalship of the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson).

In the course of his speech the minister mentioned the Berlin conference and spoke in terms which were referred to by a later speaker as rather melancholy terms. Undoubtedly the results of the Berlin conference were extremely melancholy for those who felt that there had been some hope of reaching some sort of *modus vivendi* with the Soviet union on that occasion. Of course it is easy—and unfortunately the conduct and the manner of the Soviet union representatives make it all too easy—to place the blame for the failure squarely on the shoulders of Russia. But in pointing to the mote in the Soviet's eye I wonder whether we sometimes overlook the beam in our own. Just what was our spirit when we entered the Berlin conference? I want to quote, Mr. Speaker, from reports that appeared a month before the Berlin conference. In the *Globe and Mail* of January 15, 1954, there is a report from Bonn, Germany:

The west German Bundestag moved today to change the constitution to speed German rearmament inside a European army.

Here is another report on the same day from the New York *Times*. It is headed "Bonn house gets three rearming bills" and the subheading reads "Moves to amend constitution; pass first reading despite opposition of socialists". It reads in part as follows:

Despite Socialist objections, three bills to provide for conscription and rearmament in west Germany by amending the constitution were introduced today in the Bundestag.

I suggest that those two events in themselves gravely imperilled any chances whatever of a satisfactory result coming from the Berlin conference.

I notice that there are those who feel that there was far too much haste on the

[Mr. Cameron (Nanaimo).]

part of the western representatives at the Berlin conference in the rejection of certain proposals that were made there. I quote from Mr. Sebastian Haffner, special correspondent to the London *Observer* and the *Globe and Mail*, as quoted in the *Globe and Mail* of February 25, 1954. Mr. Haffner has this to say in part:

Take, for instance, the ideas for an all-European treaty about collective security in Europe, which Mr. Molotov tabled on February 10. They were at once rejected out of hand by the western ministers as if it were possible to study all their implications and draw desperate conclusions from such a study within twenty-four hours!

Mr. Speaker, I suggest that every delegate to that conference must have known, before he entered the chamber, that the proposals that were made for the reunification of Germany and the rearming of Germany as a member of the western bloc could not possibly be accepted by the Soviet delegates.

Let us for a moment place the shoe on the other foot. Let us for a moment ask ourselves what would have been the reaction from the western powers had the Soviet union produced proposals for a free German election and for the arming of Germany after it was well known that the Soviet union had the means of drawing that armed Germany into a satellite group with herself. We know perfectly well that we would have rejected that proposal out of hand.

I suggest that the disastrous change in the viewpoint which has taken place in the western world since 1945 with regard to the rearming of Germany has been the major stumbling block to reaching an agreement with the Soviet union and its allies. There was perhaps one thing which might have united east and west with regard to Europe and that one thing was the justifiable fear of a rearmed Germany. But in spite of that, of course, we proceeded with plans for the rearmament of Germany and held up our hands in holy horror when the Russians told us that they could not possibly accept such an agreement. At Berlin no serious attempt whatever was made to reach some compromise solution that would safeguard both east and west. Moreover, not only was no serious attempt made, but there were deliberate attempts—such as those I have quoted from the Bonn Bundestag—to sabotage that conference before it ever took place.

I know quite well that to speak in this vein is to run the risk of being smeared as a communist and a communist sympathizer. It does not concern me greatly if I am so smeared, Mr. Speaker. I will say this. There is probably no one else in this house who has suffered so much at the hands of the misguided and evil characters whom the Soviet union uses as its stooges in Canada. I have