

developments, not only in the presidential election, but also in the legislative election. All in all, I would argue, Islam and Islamic issues—such as the possible implementation of shari'ah or Islamic law—have not become central and big issues throughout the general elections. In fact, Islamic issues have been conspicuously absent throughout the election year. On the contrary, Indonesian people in general have been concerned mostly with issues they face in daily life, such as continued economic hardship, rampant corruption, the lack of law enforcement, increased insecurity, the continued spread of narcotics, and other forms of social ills. The best example of this is that of the Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS or Prosperous and Justice Party), the most Islamically-conservative party that was able to substantially increase its gains in the last election from less than two percent in the 1999 election to seven percent this year. The party succeeded in getting more support not because they campaigned for the implementation of shari'a or the transformation of Indonesia into an Islamic state, but rather for the fight against corruption and creation of good governance.

So, the first direct presidential elections have substantially transformed Indonesian politics. Some of the most important tendencies are, first, that political parties have not been able to dictate their will to their members, let alone to the masses as a whole. Even though big parties like the Golkar party—which won the legislative elections—PDIP, PPP and others, forged the so-called “Nation Coalition” (*Koalisi Kebangsaan*) to contain the momentum of the SBY-JK team—who in contrast formed what they called the “People Coalition” (*Koalisi Rakyat*)—this pair won the elections anyway. More than that, the appeal of Hasyim Muzadi—the non-active national leader of NU, and Vice-Presidential candidate of Megawati Soekarnoputri—to the *kiyai* and their masses to vote in his favour also failed. These examples indicate that the Indonesian voters are now becoming more independent and more rational in their political and voting behavior; they cannot now be dictated to by their party leaders or by their *kiyai*. They now decide themselves.

Second, the election of SBY-JK also shows the continued decline of the so-called “*politik aliran*” theory. According to this theory—based on Clifford Geertz’ divisions of “*santri*” (strict Muslims), “*abangan*” (nominal Muslims) and “*priyayi*” (aristocracy)—Indonesian politics was heavily divided along religious lines and traditional loyalties. Sociological and religious changes that have been taking place since