Lesson No. 4: The process by which a verification regime is established is equally (and perhaps more) important than the substantive technical services provided to the parties.

The very process of negotiating verification procedures may serve as a prime indicator of the extent to which the parties are sincere in their efforts to establish a limited form of co-operation.[39] This is especially true for agreements involving third parties with a highly visible and intrusive verification system. Egyptian and Israeli acceptance of an active verification role for the United States in itself served as a demonstration of good faith on both sides. The very process of accepting an intrusive supervisory presence — by producing evidence of the conciliatory disposition of the parties — played a key role in reducing suspicion, thereby creating further incentive for co-operation.

Lesson No. 5: In negotiating new security arrangements multimethod verification procedures can assist the parties in meeting different objectives.

In the case of Sinai II, Israel needed stringent verification procedures for early warning and detection purposes. Israel had relied on such procedures prior to signing the Sinai II Agreement and insisted, therefore, on retaining a previously functioning national early warning station as a condition for accepting the Agreement. In short, due to the nature of its reserve mobilization system, Israel attached a higher value to the detection and deterrence functions of verification than did Egypt.

By contrast, Egypt had less military need for early warning and detection but did, for political reasons, require a national watch station in order to make the US the central component of the verification system and to create the impression of strategic symmetry with Israel.

Lesson No. 6: The use of technology-intensive verification procedures can assist the parties in avoiding situations that appear to infringe upon sovereignty.

Remembering well Egypt's difficulties with Soviet military advisers, and highly sensitive to domestic concerns regarding Egyptian sovereignty over the Sinai, President Sadat insisted that any foreign presence in Sinai had to be temporary and politically unobtrusive. The use of technology-intensive verification procedures helped limit the size of the foreign contingent, thereby minimizing the appearance of intrusiveness. In short, Sadat could sustain the long process of Israeli withdrawal politically by arguing that all measures necessary for verification were merely part of a transition to return all of Sinai to Egypt. Once the sensitivity of the sovereignty issue was overcome through Israel's complete withdrawal, a return to traditional peacekeeping practices was acceptable to Egypt as indicated by the presence of the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO).

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[39] Where the parties to a dispute have no experience in regulating their conflict behaviour, even a willingness to entertain the idea of negotiations concerning their future relationship can provide important evidence regarding commitment and seriousness.