

## *The UN, disarmament and Canadians*

not to be removed from office, the politicians will have to pay greater attention to the disarmers and arms controllers, at least in the countries which have democratically-elected governments. This growing groundswell of public opinion has created a climate which opens up a real opportunity for UNSSOD II to lead to positive steps.

### **Opening for Canada**

It goes without saying that Canada should continue to press for a revised SALT, a comprehensive test ban, and a chemical warfare treaty. It should strongly oppose a renunciation of the agreement limiting anti-ballistic missile installations to one for each superpower. These issues have been debated over and over, and they remain important. But there are new areas which need attention. Among them:

#### **1. Anti-satellite weapons (ASATs)**

Reconnaissance satellites are a tremendously important element of what are called National Technical Means of verification. In other words, they enable the superpowers to know what the other is doing and to challenge an apparent violation of SALT. They are also important for communications. The development and deployment of weapons which can destroy satellites will obviously create an element of mistrust, and that will not help maintain deterrence. Through the United Nations, a treaty has already been negotiated banning weapons of mass destruction from outer space. Perhaps this can be amended to ban ASATs as well.

#### **2. Destabilizing weapons**

ASATs by their nature would disturb the current rough nuclear balance between the two superpowers. Other developments which would be destabilizing include:

- cruise missiles, which are small and easy to conceal;
- improvements in anti-submarine warfare which would make missile-carrying submarines vulnerable;
- greater accuracy of inter-continental missiles.

Canada could propose a study to define what types of technological developments and weapons would be destabilizing and which might enhance security. This in turn could be used as a guideline for things that should be banned, either by formal treaty or informal understanding.

#### **3. The Arctic**

In 1959 the twelve nations with interests in the Antarctic signed a treaty which effectively established it as a demilitarized area. There are obvious differences between the North and South poles. The Arctic is all sea and ice, and on the shores of the Arctic Ocean, the Soviet Union has at Murmansk its largest naval base. A demilitarized zone North of the Arctic circle is probably unrealistic, but it might be possible covering the area beyond the territorial sea.

The Scandinavian countries have been considering proposals for the Nordic nuclear free zone, though this was dealt a severe blow when a Soviet submarine apparently carrying nuclear weapons ran aground near Sweden's ma-

nor naval base. Last year Leonid Brezhnev said he would consider including some part of the Soviet Union in such a zone. Canada could well take the initiative in calling a conference of experts to examine all aspects of these ideas.

#### **4. Disarmament and Development**

There is a linkage here which needs greater attention. It is easy to say that lower military spending by countries like Canada should lead to large foreign aid programs. Yet the developing countries are today the major buyers of conventional arms. Is this because they are afraid of a superpower? Or a neighbor? Or because the armed forces are required to keep order at home? Or for considerations of national prestige?

The question of how a nation or a region perceives its security, and how this can be enhanced is an important one. We have seen agreements on what are called Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). They have taken the form of reports of impending military maneuvers and the exchange of observers at these exercises. The CSCE review conference in Madrid is considering how to build on the existing CBMs. Steps should be taken to see what kind are needed for other regions.

### **Canada's policy**

External Affairs Minister Mark MacGuigan told the Secretary-General (in April 1981) that Canada hoped UNSSOD II would give the highest priority to:

- a) continuation of the SALT process;
- b) conclusion of a multilateral Comprehensive Test Ban treaty;
- c) conclusion of an agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons and their destruction;
- d) the evolution of an effective non-proliferation regime based on the Non-Proliferation Treaty; and
- e) the promotion of concrete measures to limit and reduce conventional forces.

These are admirable objectives, as far as they go. However, in today's world, there is an opportunity to be more imaginative, even adventurous. A country like Canada is well qualified to re-examine our entire approach to security. In addition to exploring the other road that arms control and disarmament can provide, perhaps we could work with like-minded nations on such things as peace-making (as well as peace-keeping) and procedures for settling disputes such as third-party mediation.

When our more powerful colleagues are still searching for an agenda, it gives a splendid opportunity to suggest things we would like to see them talk about. Perhaps they will announce at UNSSOD II their agreement to start START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, as President Reagan calls them). If we can prod them into talking about what has previously been "untalkable," it may be an accomplishment. □