

Two opposed books

United States forces in Korea, reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (from the *MacArthur Papers*):

This is a brief report of personal conferences with Jackson of Australia and Patterson of Canada, delegates on UNTCOK [United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea].

Patterson and Mrs. Patterson were the only guests at dinner at my quarters and talk was more informal with less official flavor than with Jackson. However, several interesting things came out that were worthy of note, mostly in the measure of the man himself:

A. Patterson is the number 1 outspoken apologist for Soviet Russia and for communism that I have encountered in many months. He has said we have not studied and approached communism sympathetically; that there is much good in the ideology or it would lose its following; that capitalistic nations must adjust themselves to it and adopt many portions of it, particularly in the economic field and in the social reforms expressed in the creed; that all his contacts with communists and Russians have been pleasant and favorable; that Russia's attitude toward the US is due to a real fear of American expansionism and imperialism (which he himself apparently believes exists in fact and is a bad influence in the world).

B. He is an all-out idealistic socialist who apparently believes the world will break up unless there is some radical change in the capitalistic system.

C. He, personally, is against elections in South Korea because "They will result in reactionary Rightists getting in and they will maintain themselves in power for years to come." This and other similar expressions explain his great concern over the views expressed by the spokesman of the Leftist-fringe communist infiltrated parties (all of whom are now openly demanding immediate withdrawal of both forces).

D. He states that UN cannot afford to "side with the US against Soviet Russia on the Korean question" and like Jackson ignores the factual situation in Korea and shows a belief that the Russians will give in.

E. He openly admits that his and Jackson's maneuvering in UNTCOK are definite appeasement of Russia tactics and that he is in favor of appeasement "so the Russians will lose their fear and will cooperate."

F. He brushed off the "Canada Spy Ring" as merely a normal quest for war info.

Jackson and Patterson have been teamed up since arrival here to talk UNTCOK in furthering US Mission. Apparently both have read all the Mark Gayn (*Chicago Sun, PM*), Gordon Walker (*Christian Science Monitor*) and Hugh Dean (*Telepress, ALN, Daily Worker, New Masses*) line and, upon arrival, set out to prove that it is true. Jackson has been most active and based on statements made to me I believe he will stay here and make all the difficulties he can, in case Little Assembly backs up US position. However, Jackson has not openly followed and talked the "Fellow Traveler" attitude displayed by Patterson. Patterson has dropped hints that he has advised Canada to have no part in UNTCOK if any of its actions might offend Russia. He is leaving Seoul for Tokyo on Friday. Although he told me he will return in about 1 week, I doubt if he will do so in case UN decision is against his ideas.

On April 22, 1948, Hodge informed the State Department that:

Learned this morning that Jackson, Patterson and Milner of UNTCOK called on Kimm Kiusic shortly before his departure and urged him to go to Pyongyang, saying that if Kimm's or other reasonable terms were accepted, UNTCOK might postpone election scheduled for May 10. This might have been deciding factor in persuading Kimm Kiusic to depart as he had previously, while wavering, been leaning toward not going to Pyongyang and was even attempting to find excuses why he should not go.

As far as can be ascertained at present, Jackson, Patterson and Milner took this action without consulting other delegates. Some delegates were not even in Seoul as they were in provinces on observation. Hence, we have Australia and Canada still attempting sabotage the election in South Korea. I use word "sabotage" advisedly because anyone possessing (1) a little knowledge of Soviet Policy and tactics, and (2) good common sense, must realize that nothing can come of Pyongyang Conference for Koreans or non-Soviet nations except fools paradise.

How agents behave

Barros assumes that the higher an official rises in the bureaucracy, the greater is his value to his real masters, in this case the Soviet Union, because of his more ready access to vital secret information and, presumably, more ample ability to pass on intelligence by safe means. This is a questionable, even facile, assumption. Some of the most effective spies were productive precisely because they were in very modest positions — embassy servants (Signot Constantini in the British Embassy in Rome), archivists, registry and filing clerks, dispatchers in communications centers and offices (Clyde Lee Conrad, the Walker family, Pollard and Richards). This issue of rank and status is an open question and can be left as such, but Barros, having no evidence whatsoever of Norman's passing any information of any type to the Soviet Union (compare the case of Klaus Fuchs), uses it as the entrée to what he seems to feel is a profound theme: agents of influence and disinformation.

The worth of agents of influence and of disinformation is that they are more elusive than those who merely provide secret and privy information. Their activities can be low keyed, less intrusive, and thus harder to spot. Contacts with control officers are rare, but their actions are capable of affecting the policy decisions and choices their immediate political supervisors will make. Consequently, to advance the cause of their true political masters they can go further than the secret or privy information they might convey (p.143).

Agents of influence, able to undermine policy, may or may not be formally recruited or controlled. Those who are not are "unwitting but manipulated individuals; Norman would clearly fall into that category" (p. 144). Agents of disinformation undermine sound policy processes by planting false, incomplete or misleading information. The efforts of both types of agents are, Barros assures us, linked with "special operational undertakings" (p. 144). Perhaps, but an agent passing state secrets would more likely want to protect that valuable activity and to avoid suspicion, by not seeking to influence and undermine the policy processes of the government he served in ways that demonstrably benefited his real masters. Conversely, would an official, high enough in government to be able to influence policy in decisive ways, risk detection, compromise that activity, by passing vital intelligence and government secrets? This is also an open question, but not one that allows Barros, having found no evidence of espionage by Herbert Norman, to launch into a further series of charges.