

*Industrialization
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on imports*

*White farmers
given priority
in Zambia*

Portugal and South Africa for its communications (a fact used by President Banda to justify his tactical pro-white alignment and the peculiarities of his policy towards Rhodesia and the Organization of African Unity), is now a prisoner of the Marxist FRELIMO government of Mozambique, and has become much more vulnerable to attack by his opponents based in Tanzania.

Changes in the economies of all the contestants modify the effect of blockages in the pattern of communication. Zambia has developed its coal resources and hydro-electric power, and has expanded (from a low base) its manufacturing capacity. Rhodesia, however, has done far more; its industrialization and import-replacement programs have enabled it to economize on imports. Its losses in the tobacco trade have been severe, though exports continue, but they have been partly replaced by its booming beef exports to continental Europe and by an expansion in its mineral production that has made it the world's sixth gold-producer.

The African countries, moreover, have not ended their dependence on the white economies for food. In a bad year, all of them except Malawi need to import food-stuffs — particularly maize. President Kaunda has now officially proclaimed that Zambia must make agriculture its leading industry. This is impossible, but at last he has the opportunity to emphasize to his indifferent fellow-countrymen the importance of agriculture in the light of the drop in copper prices, which squeezes them all. In the 1960s the policy was to buy out the white farmers in conformity with the policy of "Africanization". Now the remaining white (or "commercial") farmers are given priority — some 450 of them produce 40 per cent of the nation's food. Zambia's other attempts at agricultural development since 1964 have been almost uniformly unfortunate.

Mozambique dependence

Although Mozambique, too, is dependent on Rhodesia and South Africa for maize, which can hardly be replaced by seaborne imports, the regime (to the amazement of Salisbury) has closed the border, ruthlessly imposing starvation on many of its people. This action may be some measure of its doctrinaire attitude. Many citizens of Mozambique cross the border to buy food — and sell information. Malawi's position is eased, however, because it can legitimately supply food to the Marxist regime.

This year, in a war of attrition of all against all, Zambia is coming out worst.

Like Zaire (less directly involved with the south), it suffers from its dependence on copper. On top of the CIPEC cut of 15 per cent in production has come the steep fall in prices (which are hardly responding yet to the heralded upturn in world trade) and, on top of that, comes the difficulty of delivery. At the same time, Zambia suffers from rising import prices (especially on oil), which are further increased by delivery charges. The congestion at the ports is hardly improved by the interest of Tanzania, as an even poorer country, in siphoning off Zambia's export earnings (for example, Tanzania long prevented the road movement of copper to the far more efficient port of Mombasa). Zambia's social peace depends in part on avoiding unemployment, which dictates an undue maintaining of the work force on the copper belt. Tanzania is therefore producing well above cost. Zambia is able to raise credits, but, in effect, its productive resources are the collateral for such loans. Ironically, President Kaunda has nationalized the mines and restored them to the people's ownership only to see them progressively mortgaged to foreign creditors. The process cannot continue indefinitely without trouble.

Others affected

All the other countries involved have been affected. Rationing, *de facto* if not by cards, is now severe in Rhodesia. South Africa, with an enormous program of rearmament and an equally enormous commitment to developing the "Bantustans" and to raising black living standards at this critical juncture, is suffering, quite unexpectedly, from the drop in the gold price and from difficulties over many other staple exports. The economic crisis affects black and white states differently, but both fear social discontent. For Rhodesia and South Africa, the need is to maintain a rapid growth in gross national product — at least 5 per cent a year — to keep up with the growth in their black populations (about 3.5 per cent annually). In 1976, their GNPs will decline. It is no comfort to them to see that their black neighbours are worse off — for, as President Machel has shown, a black regime, secure in the righteousness of its pan-African cause, does not hesitate to exact further sacrifices from its poor.

South Africa's long-term policy has not changed. It has been accelerated. Before the Portuguese revolution, thinking Afrikaners realised that white supremacy was not a fact of nature. Policy for the future has two components. The first is merely to gain time, in the belief that pressures will