

...tive instructed and at least partially subordinated
...oviet political influence could have the
...s the app... profoundly negative implications for
...ain tasks... Not the least of these would be
...— whether... Canada a junior partner with the
...interests... in a "Fortress-America" approach
...y — that... international security problems. The
...sonnel... maintenance of security arrangements de-
...s and equip... among other things, to defend the
...l Forces... and integrity of Europe was a
...d for othe... Canadian interest.

...needed to... Finally, it was accepted that, if
...s... Canada continued to subscribe to the col-
...ear that... approach to security and to benefit
...n East-We... it, we should have to be prepared to
...to détente... a share of the common defence
...e possibi... that was fair and reasonable —
...the U.S.S... from the Canadian perspective and
...continue to... that of the other participants. The
...on the m... of a "free ride" might have super-
...ce of pow... attraction but it was an unworkable
...rmed that... for an effective defence and foreign
...ing to buy... and contrary to the postwar Cana-
...d that the... approach of pulling its weight in
...maintain... international affairs.

...This... The inevitable logic of these consider-
...it could... and the consequences flowing from
...are underlined by the fact that the
...the app... difficult decisions reached by the Govern-
...Canadian... in November 1975, with their signi-
...intertwin... financial implications, followed by
..., as well... a few weeks the announcement of the
...stern Euro... government's anti-inflation program, with
...general requirement to minimize new
...ding.

...t out
...practical results of the conclusions
...ned by the Government in the course
...ne Defence Structure Review were
...out in Mr. Richardson's November
...atement. It was decided, in the first
...nce, that, to enable the Canadian
...ed Forces to perform the various tasks
...would be required of them, a com-
...l force of approximately 100,000 per-
...el would be maintained, made up of
...0 regular personnel and 22,000 res-
...sts. Such a force would be capable of
...cting Canadian sovereignty and in-
...l security, contributing to interna-
...l security, and providing timely
...ion to civil emergencies.

...It was further decided that Canada
...d continue to maintain a mixed land
...air force in Europe and that, to
...e the continued effectiveness of the
...element, modern tanks would be
...red as quickly as possible, either by
...offit" or by the acquisition of new
...The air element of the force would
...aintained at its present level and,
...no decision was taken regarding the
...cement of the current fighter aircraft

...sition of
...of fighter
...to replac
...very in 1979

with which it is equipped, the necessary technical study of the various options is to be initiated early in 1976. These decisions, which were welcomed by Canada's European allies and by the United States, constitute an acceptance that the first line of Canada's defence is in Europe; that, though a North American country, it is appropriate for Canada to contribute to the defensive arrangements for Europe; and that, to do so effectively, the Canadian Armed Forces must have the necessary modern equipment.

It was agreed that Canada would continue to make a meaningful contribution to Alliance and North American defence arrangements in the maritime area and, with this end in view, it was decided to acquire a fleet of 18 Lockheed P3 long-range patrol aircraft to replace the aging *Argus* that has been in service since the late 1950s. When these new aircraft become available, Canada will probably have the most effective long-range maritime patrol capability in the world. One of the important considerations in the decision to replace the *Argus* fleet was the recognition that a new aircraft, in addition to contributing to collective defence arrangements, would provide a much-improved capability for protecting Canadian sovereignty interests in coastal waters and in the Arctic. Although no immediate decision was required with regard to the renewal of Canada's fleet of naval vessels, it was recognized that decisions in this area would be required in due course, and a detailed study of the considerations involved in a replacement program is also to be initiated in 1976.

In terms of North American air defence, it was decided that Canada would maintain a level of capability needed to meet sovereignty requirements for the identification and control of intrusions into its air-space. The maintenance of this capacity will, in due course, probably require the provision of a new fighter aircraft, which, it is hoped, might be met by selection of a new aircraft to be used both in North America and in Europe.

In addition, it was decided that the future structure of the Canadian Armed Forces would provide for up to 2,000 personnel to be available for United Nations peacekeeping purposes at any one time, thus ensuring that Canada would retain the capacity to be a major contributor to United Nations peacekeeping activities.

Resources provided

Most important of all perhaps, the Government accepted the need to provide the resources required to equip the Armed

*Detailed study of
naval requirements
to be initiated*