

and the world, with special reference to Morocco and India and the position of Mesopotamia and Syria. He was pleading the cause of prudence, not that of Angora, and the Allies should not promise that they would do anything which they were not in a position to enforce.

Signor Schanzer suggested that conscription was a sensitive point for so essentially military a people as the Turks; possibly the Allies might leave the whole question vague.

M. Poincaré thought that perhaps it would be better to find a vague formula such as "il sera étudié à la conférence prochaine la suppression du service obligatoire." They were only considering the main terms of the treaty.

Lord Curzon understood that the National Pact contained a provision for a conscript army. The Turks would demand it, and the Allies would have to reply; the point must therefore be mentioned, and they must stand firm on the question of principle, as they had done in the other Peace Treaties. *M. Poincaré's* formula left the question too open; it would not do to refer questions of principle to the next conference.

After further discussion the following formula was adopted in substitution for the first recommendation of the military experts:—

"Quant aux forces armées de la Turquie, les Puissances ne voient pas la possibilité d'admettre le maintien de la conscription, qui a été écartée dans tous les traités signés avec les Puissances européennes. Elles sont toutefois disposées à considérer dans un esprit amical la détermination de la période dans laquelle le système de recrutement volontaire devra être admis."

Marshal Foch read the second clause of the recommendations of the military experts (see Annex 1).

Lord Curzon enquired whether under these proposals there was any definite ratio between the size of the Turkish armed forces and that of the population of the country. Such a ratio had been provided for in the case of Austria and the other enemy countries.

General Harington said that old Turkey contained nineteen divisions, of which fifteen were raised from the territory which was to remain Turkish. He had the day before recommended to *Marshal Foch* the figures contained in the experts' proposals; these figures were based on the idea of fifteen divisions of 2,500 men each, the gendarmerie being based on the old numbers.

General Weygand said that the population of Austria was six millions, and an army of 30,000 men had been allowed, so the ratio in the case of Turkey was about the same as in that of Austria. In the case of Hungary the proportion was also about the same.

Lord Curzon asked how they were to stop conscription if Turkey were allowed to keep an army of this size.

Marshal Foch said that they would have to do it in the same way as in the case of other countries, such as Germany—by the threat of force.

Lord Curzon agreed generally, but pointed out that the case of Turkey was different to-day from that of other countries, since the Allies could not occupy portions of her territory, as they had done in the case of Germany, nor had they yet disarmed her.

The second recommendation of the military experts and the figures proposed for the Turkish forces under the new treaty were then adopted.

The third recommendation of the military advisers (see Annex 1) was then read.

Lord Curzon understood the opinion of his military advisers to be that in practice the Turks would be unable to raise any large or effective force of gendarmerie without the assistance of foreign officers, and that as they were rather to take the place of a local police force scattered over wide areas and were not intended to defend the frontiers, it was right that their numbers should be larger than the other elements.

General Harington said that they could stand behind the other frontier forces in case of emergency, but that they had no technical auxiliary troops and were therefore not on the same basis as the other Turkish forces.

Lord Curzon then referred to the principle of the division of Allied gendarmerie officers in accordance with the zones of the Tripartite Agreement, and enquired whether in fact the adoption of the last paragraph of the recommendation of the military advisers would not mean that the division in accordance with the Tripartite Agreement would be abolished.

M. Poincaré suggested that in any communication to be made to the Turks the question of the proportion of Allied officers in the Turkish gendarmerie should not be emphasised, although for his part he was quite prepared to accept the principle of equal division among the Allies of any officers provided by them to the Turkish gendarmerie.

Lord Curzon thanked *M. Poincaré* for this assurance, but thought that its application must in practice mean the abolition of article 1 of the Tripartite Agreement.

M. Poincaré said that as far as the imposition of that article on Turkey was concerned he was prepared to abandon it, but he must insist on its maintenance as between the Allies. He was not sure if *Lord Curzon* meant to ask for gendarmerie posts in all the rest of Turkey outside the two zones, but if so he must make full reservations as regards a British monopoly of gendarmerie officers in Constantinople.

Lord Curzon said that he had not made any such claim, but he had thought it undesirable, in the interests of obtaining the Turkish acceptance of a peace settlement, to revive the principle underlying article 1 of the Tripartite Agreement and to make Turkey think that French and Italian gendarmerie officers were necessarily to be imposed on her in the two zones.

Signor Schanzer said that he accepted the principle of not communicating the Tripartite Agreement to Turkey, but must insist on its maintenance *vis-à-vis* the Allies and the application of article 1. Later this might be modified by Allied agreement.

Lord Curzon again asked his Allied colleagues whether they could not accept the general principle of equal division recommended in the last paragraph of the present report of the military advisers (see Annex 1), which would be sounder from the point of view of Turkey than the Tripartite Agreement.

M. Poincaré repeated that he agreed as to the equal division of Allied officers for the Turkish gendarmerie in the *ensemble* of Turkey, but their distribution should be as far as possible in accordance with the division by zones.

The recommendations of the military advisers (Annex 1) were then adopted, but it was agreed that no reference should be made, in any document conveying the Allied terms to the Turks, to the antepenultimate and last paragraphs of the recommendations.

Demilitarised Zones.

A recommendation of the Allied naval advisers for the revision of parts of Chapter VIII of the Treaty of Sèvres (maintenance of the freedom of the straits) (see Annex 2) was adopted.

Capitulations.

The conference proceeded to consider the proposed statement with regard to the Capitulations which had been circulated by *Lord Curzon* the previous afternoon (see Annex 3).

M. Poincaré stated that he wished to make an observation upon a matter of great importance in the eyes of France which might be considered to be affected by the wording of this draft statement; he referred to the religious protectorates. He was anxious that this most important question should not be settled in advance against France by the first paragraph of the draft. He enquired whether the reference to "the proper protection of the interests of their nationals" would deprive them of all rights in regard to the protection of others than their nationals.

Signor Schanzer said that he also must make all reserves upon this matter. The question to which *M. Poincaré* referred had been settled at San Remo.

M. Poincaré stated that as he understood it the question had been settled there only for Palestine.

[8159 c—4]

B 2