

present character and direction of the Castro Government. If one were to believe a lot of the anti-Cuban propaganda appearing in the United States and here in Peru we must already regard Cuba as a Soviet satellite, at least in the political sense. I do not believe it can be regarded as a military satellite or an actual Soviet military base and probably will not become such unless an actual Soviet submarine or missile base were to be established somewhere in Cuba. Geography alone separates Cuba by a long distance from the Red Army. It presumably therefore cannot become a satellite like Roumania although it might conceivably become a satellite like Albania has been, that is somewhat isolated from the Soviet land mass. Time of course will run against the easing of tension, a settlement or an accommodation if the provision of Soviet and Czech arms, technicians and advisers increases. Presumably, however, the urge to build up the military defence of Cuba in turn depends on the régime's calculation of the prospect of direct military intervention by the United States. These matters call for the appreciation of intelligence material on Cuba which is not available to me.

4. It is of course easier to point out difficulties in Mr. Tremblay's approach than to suggest positive and constructive alternatives. I have the feeling that the difficulties from the United States side would at this stage be quite overwhelming. Because of the history of the United States relations with Latin America over nearly a century and a half, dating at least from the formulation of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, there seems to be a deep-rooted instinctive feeling of the right of leadership if not hegemony by Washington in inter-American affairs. I suggested in my Despatch No. 144 of May 25[†] that this was a complicating factor in regard to possible Canadian membership in OAS. I think it is also a complicating factor in any idea that some friend of the United States such as Canada could mediate in this quarrel with Cuba. I do not believe that the United States Administration or American public opinion is anywhere near ready to tolerate the continued existence of a neutralist state in the western hemisphere. Since the passing of John Foster Dulles neutralism has acquired a new respectability in the eyes of the State Department but there are of course degrees and kinds of neutralism. Neutrals which are considered to be on the side of the United States, such as Sweden, Switzerland and Austria can be accepted, partly because they are fairly far from the shores of the United States. Other neutrals which are considered to be more inclined to the Soviet camp are less acceptable, particularly if they are not a good distance away from this part of the world. A kind of neutralism seems to be emerging in Brazil but this can perhaps be accepted because it is a fairly large self-contained country and is not on the doorstep of the United States. In any event this would be a non-Communist and probably pro-Western neutralism whereas in Cuba perhaps the most we can hope for is a pro-Communist neutralism. For reasons of security, history and geography it would probably be too much to ask the United States to negotiate with a neutral pro-Communist state at such close quarters, especially since it might move ever nearer to the Soviet camp. Possibly after the passage of much time Washington could reconcile itself to a kind of cold co-existence with such a régime in the western hemisphere. If the Soviet Union can accept West Berlin and Communist China can at least temporarily tolerate Formosa, then it could be argued why Washington cannot learn to live with something comparable, ugly and unpalatable as it may be, in the neighbouring island of Cuba. If Castro is "just another Nasser" then perhaps the United States can learn to live with him, as the United Kingdom has learned to live with Nasser; and here again there may be a role for Canada to play.

5. Mr. Tremblay in his formula suggests that both the United States and Cuban Governments would be asked to make formal pledges of non-intervention. At least he wants them tied in firmly with the criteria which he sets forth and it might be that in this context they would have some significance. Otherwise they would be only an addition to the long list of inter-American resolutions and declarations on non-intervention. It would, I think, be hard to find in international instruments anywhere a more forthright denunciation of intervention than that