

their best to stay out and I think they will continue to do so, but I have no illusions that they would not come in at some point.

I might add very briefly, and almost in parentheses in connection with Viet Nam and Chinese foreign policy in general, there is a tendency in the west I think to believe we have to pick sides in the Chinese power struggle which is rather foolish, but if we have to pick sides the opponents of Mao Tse-tung should be supported because they seem to be more reasonable men, and to some extent in our terms they are more reasonable men. However, there is some evidence, although not definite, that the opponents of Mao Tse-tung are in trouble partly because they sought to heal the breach with the Soviet Union in order for China to be tougher on the subject of Viet Nam and more adventuresome over the Taiwan-Formosa issue. There is certainly no guarantee that Mao's opponents, if they were in power today or if they eventually achieve power, would be, in our terms, more reasonable over Viet Nam or any issue of Chinese foreign policy. I do not think any Chinese government in the foreseeable future is likely to be easy to live with from the point of view of the west, so long as it is frustrated in the basic foreign policy goals which I have described to you. I would like to leave you with a few questions. First, the obvious one is whether my description of Chinese foreign goals is a correct one which is a matter of some controversy, I would admit. Second, are these Chinese foreign policy goals really inconsistent with our own basic Western interests and do the various Western policies—primarily the American one, of course, but in a different way our own—of containment and/or isolation or partial isolation, and so forth, really serve our own Western interests, or do they simply intensify and exacerbate China's legitimate grievances against the West and make impossible any settlement of basic Asian problems?

I think finally—and this is final—it is important to ask these questions now when China is swept up in a real struggle and debate over its future course. I have said, and I repeat, I do not expect any drastic foreign policy changes in the foreseeable future since I think Chinese foreign policy goals are so fundamental and basic to national Chinese interests. On the other hand, there will certainly be in the months ahead, and there probably is today, a much greater debate over tactics, if not strategy, and this debate will intensify once Mao Tse-tung is gone. No single successor to Mao will have his tremendous power and prestige and it will now be possible, much more than it ever has been before, to call into question at the highest levels of the Chinese leadership, Mao's policies of strident opposition to both the United States and the Soviet Union especially since these policies have had such obviously little success and have resulted in some very real setbacks in the last two or three years.

I think at this time of transition in China it is very important for all the Western countries to show the Chinese that there are alternatives to their present policies—basically of hostility to us—and that an accommodation with the West can be worked out on terms that both the Chinese and the West might regard as reasonable. It will be a long-range problem, I realize. No immediate success is to be expected. I think it is obviously the United States that has to move the most but I think, without over-emphasizing our position in the world or in Asia, that Canada could play a more useful and important role than it plays at present.