

capacity to negotiate and to reach agreement over the past few years, to which I have referred, has been applied with success not only to the situation in the Middle East but also to situations which have threatened peace in Cyprus and the Indian sub-continent. In the case of Rhodesia, it has gone further and decided for the first time on a programme of sanctions. In none of these cases has the Council actually been able to bring about a settlement of the disputes in question. But I am optimistic that the procedures which the Council has set in train in the Middle East and in Cyprus will lead to constructive results.

In the end, of course, it must be the parties who by their actions will make these results stable and permanent, in so far as permanent results are possible at all in international relations. I should be the first to agree that methods for the peaceful settlement of disputes can be improved and that more attention needs to be given to the suggestions which are made from time to time by the Secretary-General or by member states for their improvement. In particular, I would draw attention to the recommendations which have been made by the present Secretary-General and by his predecessors respecting the opportunities provided in Article 34 of the Charter for the Council to enquire at an early stage into any situations or disputes which might lead to international friction, without waiting for the parties directly concerned to come to the Council first. Fact-finding commissions have probably not been employed as much as they should have been by the Security Council, and I have noted with satisfaction the recent resolution of the General Assembly requesting the Secretary-General to establish a register of names from which such commissions might be drawn.

Nevertheless, the United Nations cannot enforce the settlement of disputes. All it can do is make it easier for the parties to settle their own disputes. In that capacity the permanent members have a special role. We all know that it is their concurrence which gives special weight to the Council's resolutions. It is their continued activity and diplomacy behind the scenes which will help to ensure that these same resolutions are respected and implemented. Only in cases of a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression can the Council go further and take decisions which may lead to the use of coercive measures against particular states. Such decisions imply the end of diplomacy and for that reason are a last resort. Yet the threat of such decisions is important. Chapter VI of the Charter, on peaceful settlement of disputes, would not have the same weight or the same point if it were not followed by Chapter VII, on the maintenance of international peace and security. If we must not resort lightly to the measures described in Chapter VII, neither should we neglect or dismiss the provisions of this chapter. I think it would be helpful, therefore, if the members of the Council could agree to investigate again the possibility of negotiating the agreements called for in Chapter VII for the provision of armed forces, assistance and facilities necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.

I do not wish to leave the subject of diplomacy in the Security Council without mentioning the question of permanent membership. Mr. Hammarskjöld used to speak of the need for the United Nations to keep new conflicts outside the sphere of bloc differences or to bring them out of this sphere, if necessary, through solutions aiming at the localisation of conflict. The United Nations has done this with success in some areas. It has not been able to do so in Eastern Asia, partly because the permanent member chiefly concerned is not represented at the United Nations. Clearly the Council will be handicapped