

3.2 Multilateral Verification and Arms Control Agreement (Continued)

Over and above these questions, however, is the issue of practical politics. It is doubtful if a state or group of states allied with one or other of the Superpowers would find it politically prudent to police agreements between the Superpowers which they themselves have pledged to adhere to and verify. The US and USSR would find this representative of a lack of trust, and would see it as constituting interference, if not an attempt to secure intelligence on Superpower military programs.

It would seem, therefore, that the most logical scenario for the operation of a Paxsat system is in the context of an arms control agreement which is multilateral in nature, involving the Superpowers and other states, with Paxsat as a verification asset formally legitimated by the treaty itself. It is to the plausibility of this scenario that the discussion now turns.

3.3 Bilateral Versus Multilateral Outer Space Arms Control

The question of the 'participatory status' of an outer space arms control process and agreement may be divided into three distinct parts. First, to what extent can it be anticipated that outer space arms control negotiations will be conducted bilaterally between the superpowers, or multilaterally among a group of interested states? Second, if this process is bilateral in nature, can it be anticipated that the resulting agreement will be opened to other parties for signature? And third, if states other than the Superpowers are allowed to participate in the negotiations and/or the resulting agreement, what role can be envisioned for those states or other institutions in the implementation of the treaty provisions?

3.3.1 The Negotiation Process

There is a clear historical pattern to superpower perspective and behavior relating to bilateral approaches to arms control. In general terms, neither the US nor the USSR has demonstrated a willingness to negotiate over critical central-strategic issues except through direct bilateral channels. Central strategic