

organizations, one outcome is certain— no one will understand who decided what and who is accountable for the actions and decisions of subordinates at the conclusion of the activity.

There are two general approaches one might consider as ways to redress the shortcomings of the present department-based system. Under one conception, it is the process that needs to be modernized. That is to say, the machinery for interdepartmental and agency activities related to foreign, defence, and humanitarian interventions in coalitions should be changed to ensure better information-sharing, common analysis, policy formulation, and operational control. In other words, better coordination of separate responsibilities is the key to improved advice to governments, improved policies, and improved responses to crises. The process reform model would aim to provide governments with a coherent, coordinated plan for coalition operations before governments make commitments and to manage ongoing operations on the same basis. The reformed process model would also be aimed at establishing a one-door-in, one-door-out avenue for all Canadian dealings with other states and international organizations before and during coalition operations.

Although some might say that such a system is now in place, reformers and those who are simply uneasy with the present system are looking for some process beyond enhanced ad hoc committees. Reforming the policy and operations process would involve four main elements: some type of directive providing authority over planning, if not every decision, a permanent staff trained in "coalition dynamics," a regularized process and procedures, and an appropriate reporting channel to government. Again some might see these characteristics in the Privy Council Office, but others suggest that the PCO as ~~presently~~ ^{currently} organized cannot correct present defects without inappropriately involving itself in the internal affairs of departments and other central agencies.

A popular solution is to establish in Canada a type of national security council as an independent agency dedicated to overall security planning inside and outside Canada.¹⁶ This recommendation, while apparently based in organizational change, is in fact a process response where the staff and the methods for interdepartmental coordination and direction would be much more significant than the image of a "council" might suggest. Proponents often point to the National Security Council (NSC) in the United States, but they tend also to overlook the internecine clashes that continually erupt in Washington as the NSC wrestles with other departments and agencies for control over national security planning and operations. But, perhaps, the greatest barrier to the national security council concept in Canada is that it simply does not fit the Westminster pattern of government and attempts to pound it into the departmental structure in Ottawa would likely be stoutly resisted.¹⁷

Structural reform is a second model for security coordination and control of coalition operations. The premise of this idea is that the effective management of coordinated defence and security policy and operations requires the efficient combination of ministerial authority and a staff specifically organized for this purpose. As no minister (other than the prime minister) has responsibility for the

¹⁶. See, for example, Jane Boulden, *A National Security Council for Canada?*, *op. cit.*

¹⁷. Douglas Bland, "Defence and Security. The Next Generation," *op. cit.* p. 43.