



flow mechanisms to handle all UN internal financing, inappropriate for peacekeeping purposes. The purpose of the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund, on the other hand, is to provide adequate cash to handle the start-up costs of missions, as well as to alleviate temporary cash shortages in ongoing missions. In 1992, the General Assembly authorized the Fund at US\$150 million, although less than half of this amount is currently available. The balance was to have been filled over time with general budget surpluses, but those surpluses have been required to meet regular UN budget arrears. Even if the balance should be forthcoming, this level is inadequate for current purposes. The Secretary-General has proposed "an amount of \$800 million, a sum equivalent to approximately four months' expenditure of the peace-keeping budgets in 1993...."¹⁹

In addition to these fundamental problems, there are difficulties within the UN Secretariat and in the field because political authority for peace operations does not correspond to financial authority for disbursing funds. In essence, the UN system is overly centralized, and functions in "headquarters mode", with little or no discretionary authority to Special Representatives or Force Commanders, who are always faced with the need to disburse funds on the ground. While the principle of financial accountability must be maintained, financial regulations need to be developed which devolve financial authority to appropriate UN officials.

The Availability of Well-Trained Personnel

The core of a rapid-reaction capability is well-trained, adequately-equipped personnel. UN operations reflect the strengths and weaknesses of their component parts, and there is an undeniable variation in the training standards of peacekeeping forces, which sometimes face far different tasks in UN operations than those for which they trained. Clearly the UN has a major difficulty in achieving equal levels of capability across the gamut of troop contributors. With the explosion of peace operations in recent years, the UN has had to accept troop contributions which have been less than adequate. In areas other than military personnel, work on training has only begun, and much could be done in the areas of civilian police, humanitarian assistance, human rights and legal affairs. Because personnel in a rapid-reaction operation must deploy immediately and cannot undertake mission-specific training, the units offered by troop-contributing nations should be of comparable standards. Much, if not all, of this training is legitimately the responsibility of Member States. The role of the UN is to ensure that troop contributors work to comparable standards and that these standards are met in practice.

The UN Secretariat has done substantial work in the area of peacekeeping training, in recognition of its critical importance. It recently produced a draft Peacekeeping Training Manual, which has been distributed to Member States for additional input. It focuses on individual training, and with extrapolation could progress to collective training. It could be used as the basis of a minimum standard of individual training by Member States before troops are assigned to UN duty. Individual training alone will not be sufficient, as field missions are more oriented to group tasks than to individual ones. But progressing from individual training will require specifying training standards to be achieved at section, platoon, company and battalion levels or their equivalents.

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