

their search for means of reasserting greater control over their fate. If there were a 50 per cent cut in strategic offensive forces, it would be of unique importance to Canada. But it would also be a development that should cause Canada to look more closely at long-range cruise missiles (ALCMs and SLCMs) and the desired regime for their control, as well as possible warning and defence against such weapons.

Second is the question of the implications for NATO strategy of the INF Treaty. The ban on land-based INF missiles surely requires that NATO re-examine the links in its defensive triad of conventional, theatre nuclear and strategic nuclear forces. With the strengthening of the link between nuclear and conventional arms control comes a need for the West to redefine its objectives in the latter. Regardless of what Soviet intentions may or may not be at this time, the capability of the Warsaw Pact to conduct offensive operations cannot be ignored. The task of the Western allies is therefore to negotiate away as much as possible of the Warsaw Pact's conventional advantage. That task will be long and difficult, even with the current political impetus and the precedents from the INF negotiations, because of the West's lack of any significant military bargaining leverage. But conventional stability in Europe will come only from structural adjustments to the forces of the Warsaw Pact and probably also of NATO. Success in these negotiations, and in the follow-on negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE), where the aim should be to constrain threatening military activities, would make a decisive contribution to an easing of tensions and improved security in Europe, as well as to the reduction of military expenditures.

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