(Mr. Yamada, Japan)

would lead to concrete and pragmatic measures of arms control and disarmament. There seem to be many difficult problems involved, especially as regards the acceptability of the obligation to report military information, which relates to the problem of verification.

I would like to touch upon the protection of space objects and their activities. As the number of States that participate in space development increases and their activities become more sophisticated and diversified in the future, the need to protect space objects and their activities will become more urgent. Up to now, Japan has launched 36 satellites for such purposes as experimental launching, weather forecasting, communications and broadcasting. We are planning to launch about 10 more satellites by 1990. Japan thus has a keen interest in this issue of satellite protection. My delegation believes that space objects and their activities for peaceful purposes should not be attacked and should be duly protected.

In this context, it is highly significant that a proposal has been made to grant immunity to satellites in order to exempt them from attack. If the purport of this proposal lies in non-interference with those satellites which play an important role as NTM (national technical means) of verification, it will contribute to greater stability between the East and the West, and my delegation can support it. However, we should be very careful to make sure that satellite immunity would not in fact protect some activities which might endanger the outer space activities of other States. Much will need to be done to determine what satellites should be granted immunity. At this point, we should pay special attention to the fact that the purpose of protecting satellites cannot be achieved solely by concluding a declaratory international convention on the non-use of force.

Finally, I would like to touch upon a few basic legal issues which are under discussion in the Ad hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space.

In reviewing the international law related to arms control and disarmament in outer space, we cannot bypass the basic issue of definition of a "space weapon". There are a number of complex problems which would make an abstract definition quite inadequate. For example, how do we deal with dual-purpose technologies? How do we set the criteria for defining a weapon? Which should be regarded as more important, the purpose of use or the objective function? It would seem much more practical to seek, through our work to grasp how outer space is being actually used, to identify the instances of military use, to categorize them, and to consider such measures as may be called for.

As measures to secure compliance with article IV of the Outer Space Treaty, which prohibits the installation of nuclear weapons or other types of weapons of mass destruction in space and other celestial bodies, we may recall article XI of the same Treaty, which stipulates for the provision of information on space activities and was later developed into the Convention on Registration, and article XII, which stipulates for the opening of all stations, installations, equipment and space vehicles on the Moon and other