

RESOLUTION NUMBER (Lead sponsor)	RESOLUTION	VOTE Yes-No-Abstain
*47/60B (Russia)	Maintenance of international security	79-0-84
47/61 (Mexico)	Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)	Consensus
47/76 (Kenya)	Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa	Consensus
Decisions		
I (Colombia)	International arms transfers	Consensus
II (Peru)	Conventional disarmament on a regional scale	Consensus
III (Togo)	United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific, and United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean	Consensus
IV	Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session	Consensus

Resolutions Opposed by Canada

47/53C (India)	Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons	126-21-21
47/53E (Mexico)	Nuclear arms freeze	121-19-27

Resolutions on which Canada Abstained

47/43 (India)	Scientific and technological developments and their impact on international security	128-3-30
47/46 (Mexico)	Amendment of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water	118-2-41
47/55 (Qatar)	Israeli nuclear armament	64-3-90
47/59 (Indonesia)	Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace	129-3-35
47/60A (Indonesia)	Review of the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security	122-1-43

A resolution on the "Question of Antarctica" (47/57) was also adopted by a vote of 96-1-9. Canada, along with 61 other countries, did not participate in the vote.

*Resolution co-sponsored by Canada

Reassessing the UN Disarmament Machinery (continued from p. 15)

the groundwork for the CD through the development of principles as well as by providing, at least potentially, a degree of focus for the CD agenda.

We believe that a mechanism is required to provide a greater degree of linkage between the UNDC and the CD in order for UNDC deliberations to become more relevant and results-oriented... In the longer term, when membership of the two bodies is more similar, the merging of the two may be feasible, especially if cost factors can be overcome. Greater linkage between the UNDC and the CD will, however, be problematic as long as membership of the CD remains restricted and UNDC membership universal.

Within the UN, the reform process in the UNDC is most advanced. For example, we are well on the way to achieving a

rolling, three-item agenda which, on the one hand, ensures a degree of predictability while, on the other, allows us to incorporate contemporary issues in a timely manner.

Beyond this, the UNDC is at the stage where it has too much time to engage in general debate but — without more advance preparation by delegations — too little time for in-depth dialogue on complex issues in which there exist some rather fundamental differences of view. In order for the Disarmament Commission to live up to its full potential, every effort must be made to circulate focused working papers — preferably reflecting joint efforts of a number of countries spanning differences of view — in advance of the session so delegations come prepared for in-depth dialogue.

The CD

The primary role of the Conference on Disarmament is to negotiate global arms control and disarmament instruments. The CD can also usefully conduct pre-negotiation discussions, as it currently does on a nuclear test ban and outer space. Conclusion of the Chemical Weapons Convention has, however, temporarily exhausted a meaningful agenda for that body. Negotiation in the CD of a treaty to eliminate all nuclear testing in all environments for all time remains a priority objective. There should be strong verification provisions building on the work of the Group of Scientific Experts to establish global monitoring mechanisms.

CD procedures and membership are closely linked but subsidiary to its substantive negotiating agenda. We have recog-