

Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr. V. Molotov, during the Big Four Foreign Ministers' Conference in Geneva (October 27 - November 16). The Soviet Union refused to recognize the merits of the Eisenhower suggestions for the establishment of a warning system pending agreement on a general disarmament programme. Its representatives argued that the President's plan did not provide for the reduction of armaments nor did it diminish the danger of atomic war, and that consequently, the plan was unacceptable. Mr. Molotov let it be known, however, that his Government would be prepared to regard favourably the proposal for aerial photography as one of the forms of control "at the final stage of putting into effect measures for the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons". This statement was welcomed by the United States Secretary of State, Mr. J. F. Dulles, who at the same time drew attention to the fact that the Eisenhower programme should be regarded as a prelude to general disarmament and did not, of course, exclude such a programme, but might, on the contrary, facilitate a meeting of minds on the disarmament problem as a whole. For these reasons, the Eisenhower plan has been welcomed by the Western members of the sub-committee. For its part, the Canadian Delegation attached great importance to the consideration that Soviet acceptance of the Eisenhower proposals would undoubtedly contribute to a lessening of international tension and increase confidence, thus making further progress easier in the field of disarmament. By the same token, agreement on the Eisenhower plan would create a more favourable atmosphere for the settlement of political issues on which some headway has to be made if disarmament negotiations are to progress. The Canadian Delegation also welcomed the Eden proposal for a pilot scheme on inspection and the French plan for the control of military budgets, although the Canadian Delegate expressed some reservations about the possibility of a disarmament scheme which relied solely on budgetary controls.

While the sub-committee discussions in New York permitted a useful exchange of views on the proposals put forward in Geneva, its members found themselves unable to reach any conclusions because of the non-committal attitude of the U.S.S.R. on these proposals and also because of the U.S.S.R.'s negative approach to the question of control. Accordingly, the sub-committee's report on its work in 1955 did not contain any recommendations. On November 25, the Disarmament Commission (consisting of the members of the Security Council and Canada) took note of the report and decided, in view of the late hour, merely to forward it to the General Assembly for consideration at its tenth session which was then in progress.

In the course of the disarmament discussions in 1955, it was recognized by all that one of the dangers of which nations had been warned earlier, had materialized, i.e. that adequate scientific control for ensuring the elimination of accumulated stockpiles of nuclear weapons was not at present technically possible. Apart therefore from the establishment of a warning system as a gateway to general disarmament along the lines suggested by President Eisenhower, the only practicable course pending a scientific "break-through" which would once again permit effective and full international control was early agreement on a partial disarmament programme comprising all such measures as were susceptible to effective control. A draft resolution suggesting, among other things, this twofold programme was put forward by Canada and the other Western members of the sub-committee at the tenth session of the General Assembly and ultimately approved by a vote of 56 in favour, 7 against (Soviet bloc), with 0 abstentions. The resolution urged the states concerned, and particularly the members of the sub-committee (1) to continue their efforts towards reaching agreement on a comprehensive disarmament programme and