

up of criteria for limiting national armed forces and armaments, and (c) that they were to include atomic weapons as well as conventional armaments in the same scheme. The control of atomic energy and the prohibition of atomic weapons were to be dealt with on the basis of the United Nations plan unless and until a better one was devised.

The tripartite proposals were met initially by Mr. Vyshinsky's notorious comment that he "had not been able to sleep for laughing" at their inadequacy, and by familiar Soviet accusations about the aggressive intentions of the Western powers. Later, however, the Soviet Delegations produced counter-proposals which advocated: (a) that the unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons should be embodied in a convention and enforced under strict international controls; (b) that the five major powers should reduce their armed strength by one-third in one year; (c) that, within a month of the Assembly's decision to prohibit atomic weapons and reduce the armed strength of the major powers, all states should furnish complete information on their armed forces, including data on atomic weapons and on military bases abroad; (d) that an international control organ should be established within the framework of the Security Council to implement these decisions; and (e) that a world conference to consider these arrangements should be called not later than June 1, 1952. The Western delegations pointed out that there was nothing new in Mr. Vyshinsky's proposals, particularly with respect to the question of inspection, on which they had already demonstrated that the Soviet position was unsatisfactory.

In the Assembly's Political Committee, to which these two sets of proposals were referred, there was general approval for the Western proposals but also recognition that little practical progress could be achieved without Soviet co-operation. When, therefore, a proposal was introduced jointly by Iran, Pakistan and Syria to establish a sub-committee, consisting of the representatives of France, the United Kingdom, the United States and the U.S.S.R. under the chairmanship of the President of the Assembly, to formulate "agreed proposals", it was unanimously accepted with the proviso that the sub-committee should report back within ten days.

The sub-commission met in closed session. Although it was unable to reach agreement on any major point of substance, except to replace the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments by a single new commission, its deliberations were amicable and businesslike, in contrast with subsequent discussions on this subject, and they achieved a moderate measure of mutual understanding. The meetings were also useful in furnishing as clear an indication as is available of the Soviet attitude on these matters. The Soviet Union is apparently unwilling to disclose any information on its armed forces or armaments until a binding decision has been taken by all the great powers to prohibit atomic weapons and reduce armaments and armed forces. It also insists that, without an immediate declaration of unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons, it will not embark on the establishment of a control plan. Under the Soviet proposals as discussed in the sub-committee, a binding decision on prohibition would be taken simultaneously with a decision to set up international control. Under this plan, there would be a period of indeterminate duration in which