render the patient more susceptible to disease; but, granting that, it was very far from proving or raising a reasonable inference that Hawley's death was the direct, immediate, and natural consequence of the injuries he sustained by the explosion.

Questions were submitted to the jury; they found negligence on the part of the defendants; "that there was a small escape of gas and not sufficient to drive out the air which would make an explosive mixture in the meter;" no negligence on the part of the deceased; and that the explosion occurred in the meter. Question 7 was: "Was the death of Hawley the natural or ordinary consequence of the injuries he sustained on the 24th September, 1918?" A. "Yes." The jury assessed the plaintiff's damages, on the assumption that the injuries caused death, at $2,000; and damages for injuries not occasioning loss of life, $500.

"There must be . . . a link strong or weak to connect cause and event. It is not enough to establish a possibility and stop there:" Reed v. Ellis (1916), 38 O.L.R. 123, 136. The death must appear to be not only a proximate and immediate result, but it must be independent of an intermediate cause: Scholes v. North London R.W. Co. (1870), 21 L.T.R. 835; Halsbury's Laws of England, vol. 10, pp. 318 to 322, paras. 586 to 592.

There was no evidence upon which the answer to question 7 could be based.

The action should be dismissed, and with costs, if asked.

LENNOX, J. FEBRUARY 24TH, 1919.

BARRY v. CANADIAN PACIFIC R.W. CO.

Railway—Collision—Negligence—Death of Person Travelling as Caretaker of Livestock at Reduced Rate—Special Contract—Approval of Railway Board—Exemption from Liability—Knowledge of Deceased—Action under Fatal Accidents Act.

Action under the Fatal Accidents Act, brought by the father of Matthew Lorne Barry, who was killed while travelling on a freight train of the defendants, to recover damages for his death, for the benefit of the plaintiff and his wife.

The action was tried without jury at a Brockville sittings.

J. A. Hutcheson, K.C., and M. M. Brown, for the plaintiff.

R. A. Pringle, K.C., and W. L. Scott, for the defendants.

LENNOX, J., in a written judgment, said that it was admitted that the plaintiff's son was killed on the 28th March, 1918, in a collision, while he was travelling on a freight-train, and that he