

That an investigation conducted with such skill and patience, starting from the most advanced tenets of modern science, and leaving the teachings of religion altogether on one side, should arrive practically at the same solution of the moral problem that Christianity affords, cannot but be a source of satisfaction to the Christian. We have always maintained that religion and science are not really opposed when the true meaning of each is seen, and we could hardly have a stronger proof of this than that here afforded. Why, on the other hand (unless from prejudice), should Mr. Herbert Spencer try so hard to minimize the resemblance between his own conclusions and those of Christianity?

After pointing out that his conception of an ideal standard in morals is latent in the beliefs of the Greek ethical writers, he continues with the strange suggestion that "in modern times, influenced by theological dogmas concerning the Fall and human sinfulness, and by a theory of obligation derived from the current creed, moralists have less frequently referred to an ideal."¹ Whether as a matter of fact modern ethical writers refer less frequently to an ideal is a point we will not now discuss, but certainly Christianity cannot be rendered responsible for the neglect of this doctrine. How can any one believe in the Fall or in human sinfulness without recognizing an ideal? "The very conception of disordered action implies a preconception of well-ordered action;"² and the very conception of sinfulness implies the preconception of a sinless state.

Let us now review the conclusions at which we have arrived. We find that the popular voice in all times and places declares certain actions to be right, or such as ought to be done. We desire, then, to discover in what these actions agree, and then to frame a scientific definition of right actions. We find on first inquiry that the only point on which they all agree is that they are according to some rule. But we cannot accept the definition that right actions are actions according to rule, because we see that rules may contradict each other, and thus the same act may be (and sometimes is) called right

¹ *Ibid*, p. 278.

² *Ibid*, p. 277.