

The horrors never happened. Kenyatta was soon "Mzee" to everyone, and won the support of white farmers at a single remarkable meeting in Nakuru when he talked to them about common problems like stock thefts and by the end had them up on their feet shouting "Harambee" — Pull together. ("The Turning-Point Speech", it was called on the memorial record sold when he died.) Some of the country's best farmland in the Rift valley was turned over to African ownership by orderly purchase, covered by a British Government loan. Forest fighters were quietly pensioned off. Tom Mboya, as Kenyatta's troubleshooter, speedily replaced the regionalist constitution with a centralized form of unitary government, and KANU and KADU converged rather than clashed. Of course, not everything came up roses: some white farmers trundled south, telling alarming stories to explain their move; Mboya and the KADU leader, Ronald Ngala, met violent ends. But Africans with their characteristic skill in human relations overcame many chasms that had seemed frightening.

And so to Zimbabwe, and the Lancaster House conference that began on September 10. It took 14 weeks of hard bargaining for Lord Carrington to hammer out agreement on three matters: an independence constitution, arrangements for the period of transition between a ceasefire and independence (including elections), and the ceasefire arrangements themselves. Let us address two questions. Which delegation came out of the marathon conference with the balance of advantage? And what hopes are there that these arrangements will lead to lasting peace and prosperity for Zimbabwe?

Fug-of-Peace

The Salisbury delegation led by Bishop Muzorewa began unsteadily and also unrealistically, but not for long. It started by tabling, as its contribution to the debate on an independence constitution, a copy of the current constitution that is based on the March 3rd Agreement between Smith's Rhodesia Front, Muzorewa's UANC and smaller groups led by Ndabaningi Sithole and Chief Chirau. Since under this constitution 28 white M.P.s could prevent, for at least 10 years, the Africanization of senior posts in the civil service, police and army, it was hardly what Bishop Muzorewa really wanted. He was happy after two weeks to manoeuvre Ian Smith into being a minority of one, while the other 11 delegates accepted Carrington's proposals. These reduced the number of M.P.s to 20 out of 100, and removed their veto powers by providing that a constitutional amendment bill could be passed by a 70 percent vote (although to alter the Declaration of Rights requires an unanimous vote).

After that, although the Bishop made a show of saying no fresh elections were needed to implement these changes, his delegation was swift to agree to successive British proposals on transitional arrangements

and cease-fire plans. It was also smart to do so. For its quick acquiescence produced a two-to-one situation in which Lord Carrington, tough in that urbane way some British patricians have, spent his weeks tugging the Patriotic Front on to the common ground he now shared with Muzorewa and which he claimed was middle ground. He had remarkable success.

The two sections of the Patriotic Front, Joshua Nkomo's ZAPU and Robert Mugabe's ZANU, came to London well prepared and in a mood of cool determination. They were not going to walk out in a temper, and give the game to Muzorewa; just to make sure, comrades from the front line states of Tanzania, Mozambique and Zambia paced round the periphery of the conference to encourage the PF leaders to stay in it. They maintained unity in public very convincingly; the ZANU and ZAPU spokesmen, Edison Zvogbo and Willie Musururwa, were an amiable and astute duo in daily briefings. Nevertheless, the PF leaders conceded a great deal, starting with the acceptance at each of the three stages that the British proposals rather than their own documents should form the basis for negotiations.

To give the main examples, the British team offered minor accommodations on the constitution: it lowered the qualification for a High Court judge from 10 years to seven years of being qualified to practise as an advocate; and it reshaped the Senate to give the Assembly and Prime Minister together the nomination or election of half of the 40-strong chamber, instead of 10 out of 30. But these concessions are insignificant when compared with the constitutional points on which the PF yielded:

—instead of an executive president, they accepted a constitutional head of state, elected by M.P.s, and an executive prime minister.

—they opposed the automatic granting of Zimbabwean citizenship to everyone who is now a Rhodesian citizen or has the qualifications for becoming one, saying that the critical date should be November 1965 (UDI time); they reasoned that those who had come to Rhodesia after UDI were likely to be white supremacists unwanted in Zimbabwe.

—they argued against the "racialism" of having any reserved seats voted for by a separate roll (in Kenya and Tanzania non-blacks have been elected on a common roll), and then accepted the provision of 20 which seats — a figure wildly out of proportion to the whites' 3 percent share of the actual population.

—they objected to the whole idea of paying white settlers off if their farmland is expropriated, but have now accepted as part of the Declaration of Rights the obligation to make "prompt payment of adequate compensation . . . remittable within a reasonable time to any country outside Zimbabwe".

Further concessions by the PF followed during the seven weeks spent arguing on the arrangements for a ceasefire and pre-independence elections. The British