

the very end of the disarmament process, if ever. The USA is not prepared to accept a definite commitment to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons and is contemplating placing such weapons at the disposal of the UN Peace Force.

(c) Agreement will not be possible if one of the parties seeks military advantages for itself, and attempts to preserve until the final completion of disarmament not only the means of nuclear attack but also foreign bases for the purpose of aggression.

(d) Agreement on verification will not be possible if it infringes the security of states and provides intelligence on existing armaments, rather than simply ensuring that agreed disarmament measures are being carried out.

(e) Agreement on measures for the maintenance of international peace and security will not be possible if they violate the provisions of the UN Charter and invade the sovereign rights of states.

5. The United States delegation is likely to emphasize the following main themes in conformity with the position which the USA and its Western allies have taken in the ENDC:

(a) The USA plan, by providing for gradual and percentage reductions of armaments from the beginning to the end of the disarmament process, has been so designed as to preserve the present military balance and relative degree of mutual security until the ultimate objective of general and complete disarmament has been achieved. By contrast the Soviet plan, by eliminating the means of delivery of nuclear weapons and foreign bases in the first stage would leave the USSR and its Warsaw Treaty partners with a marked preponderance of conventional strength and strategic advantage in Europe. This would decrease international security and might make war not less but more likely. The United States plan aims not only at eventually eliminating the threat of a nuclear war, but at preventing any war whether nuclear or conventional, during the process of disarmament.

(b) The Soviet claim that its proposal for the 100% elimination of nuclear weapons delivery vehicles will eliminate the threat of a nuclear war is a delusion; since it will always be possible to use improvised means of delivery, such as rockets and planes retained for civilian purposes, in the event of a war emergency. This would be true even if the destruction of the nuclear weapons themselves were to be included in the first stage, as there would be no sure way of ensuring that some of these weapons had not in fact been retained.

(c) The USA plan provides for verification commensurate with the disarmament being carried out. The progressive zonal inspection scheme is the most promising and the only practical method which has been suggested so far, to achieve this objective. The Soviets have never shown how their proposals to eliminate all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in the first stage, and all nuclear weapons either in the first or the second stage, could be adequately and satisfactorily verified.

(d) Disarmament will not necessarily eliminate the use of force as an instrument of national policy unless it is accompanied by adequate measures for the maintenance of international peace and security and the settlement of international disputes.

6. One tactical line which the Soviet delegation might follow is to submit a substantive resolution which would embody in general terms some or all of the five fundamental concepts outlined in paragraph 4 above. Alternatively, it might encourage the neutral countries to submit resolutions which would deal with one or the other of these five points. For instance, the Indian delegation in the ENDC has generally agreed with the Soviet point of view that there should be a single treaty containing firm obligations and a definite time limit which should be as short as possible. Ethiopia could be encouraged to re-submit in a modified form its resolution of last year on the prohibition of nuclear weapons. A group of uncommitted countries might be found to sponsor a resolution stipulating that measures for the maintenance