

and are easy and resigned in this hope, that *France* will command, not destroy them; she will encompass them with her power, but save them for her interest; their numerous vessels, numberless seamen, and inexhaustible naval stores will be all at her disposal. And thus supplied, and thus possessed of the sea coast from *Holland* to *Bayonne*, an invasion of *Britain* which even now, our author thinks should not be slighted, will wear a more threatening aspect; or without threatening will be more formidable. Thus *Hanover* may be the road to *England*.

If it should be asked why the conquest of *Hanover*, so unimportant as it is represented, should be made a condition by the house of *Austria* for her cessions to *France*,—the answer is obvious; because the conquest of *Hanover* by *France*, and the destruction of the King of *Prussia* by *Austria* and *Russia*, would render the Empress Queen mistress of *Germany*. The author has pointed out, p. 33, 42, uses to which *Hanover* may be applied.—it may be given to *Wurtemberg*, or to *Saxony*.—no matter to whom,—to an old papist, or to a renegado from protestantism, if the protestant power be broken; and the *Palatinate* affords an instance exactly similar. The *Prussian* territories parcelled out, and *Hanover* trusted to safe hands, the house of *Austria* may then revert to her old system, when