

*Supply—National Defence*

allow any sector to go unguarded. They have to participate in every form of defence activity, even though they may have doubts themselves, as they have in connection with the Bomarc. But Canada is not in that position. We have a limited amount—although a big amount—to spend on defence and we have to be particularly careful that we use it to the best advantage. Normally the best way in which to use it is for defence which makes a contribution to genuine collective security. If we feel that certain proposals which are put forward are not in our view desirable for Canadian action then we cannot be a dog in the manger and prevent others from doing them who are our allies if they work for collective security.

So far as the army is concerned, it seems to me that the army should consist—and I put this suggestion forward with some hesitation to an expert in this field—of mobile brigade groups and that there should be sufficient air transport available to pick up an entire brigade group and deliver it anywhere in the world where required, whether it is required as part of a NATO contribution, as an international peace contingent or for other duties specified by the Canadian government from time to time. I think nothing can be much more important now than the equipment of the army for that purpose. If that means cutting down on some other expenditure it should be done. I think the government must now decide, and presumably it is in the midst of negotiation with the United States with a view to coming to a decision on the use of tactical nuclear weapons. The government, especially in view of what General Norstad has said, must decide whether these forces are to be armed with tactical nuclear weapons. If the decision is in the affirmative, surely the government must insist that any such weapons are under Canadian control and operation. It is a position that I think that any self-respecting nation would take. I cannot believe that, when confronted with the necessity for taking that position, the United States would consider it an unreasonable one.

There are some considerations which must be in the minds of the government in coming to a conclusion in this matter, and I hope the conclusion will be reached shortly. Perhaps I might mention one or two of them. The minister will know that tactical nuclear weapons have now been reduced to a point where they can be used by small formations against purely military targets. They are conventional almost in the sense that they are ordinary weapons with nuclear ammunition, but used in almost the same way as if it were ordinary ammunition. Second, if these weapons were not used, NATO forces in

Europe would be facing armies which had them and would not hesitate to use them. Unless we can get international agreement on this matter, the resulting military disparity created might well be considered intolerable to NATO morale. If the Canadian forces were deprived of these weapons or were not permitted to use them—this is a consideration which no doubt the government has very much in mind—their morale could hardly be expected to remain very high if they were serving alongside NATO forces which had these tactical nuclear weapons.

The matter is obviously as complex as it is important but it should certainly be given consideration, and I hope the house will have the views of the government on this matter before long. One important factor—and I want to mention this so that what I have said will not be misunderstood—in coming to a decision on this matter surely must be the possibility of abolishing the use of all atomic weapons by international agreement. Whatever decision is reached on this particular matter, I believe that Canada should use to the utmost its influence to discourage nations—and I have mentioned this matter before; it is perhaps a matter for the United Nations—which do not now manufacture atomic weapons from embarking on programs for their production. Nothing could be more disastrous for peace and security in the future than if twenty, thirty, forty or fifty nations in the world were producing nuclear weapons.

As far as naval policy is concerned, I may have a little bit more to say on that matter later. It seems to me that naval policy should be based, if not exclusively, almost exclusively on protection against submarine attacks. If nuclear submarines are required, as Admiral Rickover has stated, as the most effective submarine killers, perhaps Canada should explore the possibilities of a production sharing arrangement with Great Britain or the United States whereby Canada might obtain her requirements in exchange for components or other Canadian defence equipment without the necessity of embarking on an extensive program of development and production which it seems to me, in view of economic circumstances, would be unwise.

The upshot of all this, Mr. Chairman, is that I am advocating a complete re-examination and re-assessment of the defence problem as a means of solving defence problems on the part of the government in the light of the changes that have taken place. I am not now advocating a reduction or a substantial reduction of our defence effort. But I do not think that we are getting the maximum results for the expenditures we are making. I think we are making expenditures on