

involve monitoring through data collection. It seems unlikely that this situation will continue without some provision for a mechanism by which anomalies or ambiguities in the data provided by a national authority are reviewed. It is also possible that there could be a concern about the capability of these facilities to produce schedule 2 chemicals. Hence this paper assumes that there might be inspections at schedule 3 facilities and that these would be less extensive than those required for schedule 2 or in relation to the proposal for CW-capable facilities. Assuming a frequency of one inspection per year, that no more than three inspectors would be involved, and that no inspection would last for more than three days, one could estimate the requirements for such inspections.

The major problem is in assessing how many plants are involved. Beck's analysis of schedule 3 production suggested that 78 companies might be involved (possibly with more than one location per company). The number of CMEA operations is understated: e.g. the GDR is not listed in Beck's paper, even though it is known to produce some substances such as phosgene (at Schwarzheide). However, the actual number is not likely to be much larger, since there is a tendency in industry for the concentration of activities related to the production of chemicals used in large commercial quantities. For the purposes of this paper, the actual number of plants is assumed to be of the order of 100.