

in the future. The issues cover a wide range of technical, organizational, political, operational and theoretical dimensions. Many of the possible research issues have to do with applying existing approaches in generally similar contexts. However, some of the research possibilities identified here suggest that genuinely new thinking about verification and how to achieve it may be in order and that new possibilities for effective verification may exist. It will require, however, unconventional and rigorous thinking to uncover many of these possible insights.

From the preceding extensive discussion of verification-related research issues, the following questions deserve special attention:

1. Would it be desirable to share the use of monitoring and compliance evaluation technologies and/or organizations between traditional arms control regimes and unrelated activities with similar requirements? Examples of potential associated activities include: peacekeeping support; environmental monitoring; resource monitoring and development; detection of drug smuggling; and detection of illegal immigration.
2. Can multilateral monitoring and verification organizations operate effectively within multilateral arms control and confidence-building regimes and regional organizations? Are they the only way to guarantee effective verification for every participating state? What do they offer and what do they risk?
3. What is the relationship between the verification process and the confidence-building process? How do CBMs strengthen the verification process and can verification measures undermine the confidence-building process?
4. Can combinations of verification measures (and CBMs) in separate agreements collectively produce verification synergy, a verification product that exceeds that of the component parts? Can the verification measures in a single agreement, if properly designed, yield a similar overlapping synergy?
5. Will the verification of maritime arms control and confidence-building agreements, whether global or regional, pose special problems? Will they be difficult to resolve?
6. How extensively can the use of co-operative and facilitating measures (voluntary inspections, the removal of concealing structures, data exchanges) assist in the effective functioning of a verification regime?
7. How could nuclear weapons material cut-off agreements be verified? Would there be insurmountable or grave technical difficulties in doing so?
8. To what extent is the contemporary understanding of the "verification process" an ethnocentric or culturally limited one? Can the concept and practice of using a verification regime be exported to regions with different political cultures and habits of thought? As a corollary, do analysts and policy makers fully understand what is entailed in the "verification process"?
9. Will a multilateral outer space non-weaponization agreement prove necessary and would it pose any special verification problems?
10. As conventional force sizes continue to decline, will a greater interest develop in "defence transformation" agreements that seek to confer on those forces a more defensive character? How could such transformations be monitored and verified?

