

Security Competition Results

On March 4, External Affairs Minister Barbara McDougall announced the results of the first Cooperative Security Competition Program. The Program provides financial assistance to projects that advance understanding and public discussion of issues related to cooperative security, one of Canada's central foreign policy objectives.

The Program received over 90 proposals for research studies, conferences, publications and other projects. After a careful review, 47 projects totalling \$1.2 million were chosen. Preference was given to projects dealing with significant international issues from a Canadian perspective or with direct relevance to Canada, projects promoting cooperation between individuals or institutions across Canada, and projects promoting consultation and the dissemination of ideas or information.

The concept of cooperative security recognizes that true peace and security depend on dialogue and cooperation between states across the entire range of their relations, from political and social issues to military and economic matters. Projects selected in the first competition include studies on cooperative security in the post-Cold War era, the politics of peacemaking and peacekeeping, environmental security and freshwater resources, multilateral missile defence regimes, nuclear non-proliferation, and security and conflict issues in Europe, Africa, the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific region. Other successful projects include conferences and publications on such issues as peacekeeping, preventive diplomacy, peace enforcement, maritime security and middle powers in the new world order.

The Program welcomes further applications. Deadlines are April 30 for an August decision and October 31 for a February decision. To obtain an application form or a list of recipients, contact: Cooperative Security Competition Program, 55 Metcalfe St., Suite 1180, Ottawa, Ontario, K1P 6L5. Tel: (613) 233-4448. Fax: (613) 238-2062.

Towards a Nuclear Test Ban

The following are excerpts from a speech by Ambassador for Disarmament Peggy Mason at a United Nations Regional Conference on "Disarmament and National Security in the Interdependent World," held in Kyoto, Japan from April 13 to 16.

Proliferation, of both conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction, has become one of the greatest perils facing the international community in the post-Cold War period. Though we have long been concerned about the dangers of proliferation, we now live in an environment in which rivalries that had been suppressed, contained, or in some cases merely masked by the frozen surface of the Cold War landscape, are now re-appearing around the globe. The recent decision of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) to quit the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is a stark reminder of the dangers we face. Meeting in Kyoto, we cannot but recognize the implications of this retrograde step for regional and international stability.

In perhaps what is a supreme and tragic irony, just as decisive steps have been taken to halt and to begin to reverse the "vertical" nuclear arms race, the "horizontal" dimension of nuclear proliferation seems to be accelerating at an alarming rate.

Significance of a CTBT

Where does a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT) fit into this post-Cold War proliferation scenario — for perhaps no single disarmament objective has so preoccupied the United Nations for so many years as the goal of an end to all nuclear test explosions in all environments for all time?

Despite the failure of United Nations efforts throughout the Cold War period to engage the nuclear-weapon states in meaningful negotiations towards a global test ban, the international community did manage to keep the issue front and centre on the multilateral arms control and disarmament agenda. The convening of the 1991 Partial Test Ban Treaty Amending Conference and the role the

test ban issue played in the failure of the 1990 NPT Review Conference to reach an agreed Final Declaration are but two of the most dramatic examples of the pre-eminent status the test ban issue has achieved.

Now that the Cold War is over and with it superpower military competition, many would argue that the "symbolic value" of the CTBT far outweighs the concrete benefits that might flow from it. What then are those benefits? If proliferation poses a grave danger to the maintenance of international peace and security — as my government believes it does — what role will a CTBT play to curb that danger?

Clearly a CTBT will *not* impede the ability of existing nuclear-weapon states to manufacture additional weapons using old designs, nor will it have any effect on delivery systems. Considerable progress has already been made between the US and Russia in this regard in the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF), START I and START II treaties. Nonetheless, a CTBT is not a substitute for further negotiated reductions in existing nuclear arsenals of the US and Russia and for similar actions by the other three nuclear-weapon states...

As the examples of Iraq and North Korea vividly demonstrate, we face perhaps as never before the potential for a dramatic increase in the number of states both capable of, and inclined towards, producing nuclear weapons. And the reluctance of threshold states to give up their nuclear weapon option is based largely on

Despite its symbolic value, a comprehensive test ban treaty is no panacea for nuclear proliferation, either vertical or horizontal.

their own geostrategic assessments of regional political and military rivalries. Therefore, while a cessation of tests — by de-emphasizing the military role of nuclear weapons — could affect the views of the threshold states, a nuclear test ban is unlikely to be sufficient in and of itself for their definitive renunciation of nuclear weapons.