

course, that the General Assembly can only recommend action under this section, and it remains for the individual members to decide whether they will adopt or reject the recommendation. As I have said before, a recommendation based on justice and a true knowledge of the facts as ascertained by a United Nations commission itself must have very great authority and force and no loyal member of the United Nations will find it easy to refuse to act under it.

The crisis in Korea was one to which my country was able to respond quickly by sea and in the air. But we did not have land forces which we could make immediately available. We have, however, seized this opportunity to begin to carry out the purposes of paragraph 8 of this draft resolution at once and, authorized by the Parliament of Canada, we have recruited a special force which is being specially trained and equipped for carrying out our undertakings under the United Nations Charter in the future. I venture to express the hope that the great majority of the members of the United Nations will take similar action under this section if and when it receives the approval of the General Assembly. If so, and if we are again confronted with an emergency such as that which faced us last June, we who accept our obligations under the Charter and desire to do what we can to carry them out will be in a better position to make a speedy and effective contribution to the defeat of aggression. Indeed, if sufficient forces of this kind could be held in readiness it would be a powerful deterrent to anyone who would disturb the peace. On the other hand, it would be most unsatisfactory, I think, if only a few members of the United Nations were willing to take appropriate action under this section. For this reason we believe that all states members should give early and serious consideration to this recommendation that they should maintain, within their national armed forces, elements for the implementation of United Nations resolutions.

Then we come to the last section, section D. Some doubts have been raised as to the advisability of the inclusion of this section in the draft resolution. The Representative of Australia in his statement yesterday expressed his doubts, and in so doing I think he read far more extensive power and responsibilities into this section than certainly was intended by the authors of the draft resolution. The intention in section D is straightforward and seems to us to be a very wise one.

Under section C we are putting, we hope, certain forces and resources at the disposal of the United Nations. Surely it is not unreasonable to suggest that an ad hoc committee.. a temporary committee.. should be set up under section D to report to the Security Council and the General Assembly before next September on methods by which the principles which we set forth in section C can be worked out in the light of the response which has been made to this draft resolution. For instance, among other matters this committee might examine and state the arguments for and against a small, specially recruited international force along the lines which have been recommended, among others, by the Secretary-General. As I understand it, no question arises in this section — or indeed in paragraph 9 of section 1 — of United Nations military planning or of Mr. Trygve Lie on his white horse leading his forces down Grand Central Parkway. Nor is there any question of an inquisitorial investigation of the natural resources of member states. This is to be merely a committee to study and report in the same way that other United Nations committees have studied and reported.

But if the wording of this section gives rise to misunderstanding and difficulty, possibly amendments could be introduced to remove some of these doubts...

## Appendix 10

**General Assembly Resolution, November 4, 1950: Spain**  
**(Vote: 38 in favour (including Canada), 10 against, 12 abstentions)**

*The General Assembly,*  
*Considering that:*

The General Assembly, during the second part of its first session in 1946, adopted several recommendations concerning Spain, one of which provided that Spain be debarred from membership in international agencies established by or brought into relationship with the United Nations, and another that Member States withdraw their Ambassadors and Ministers from Madrid,

The establishment of diplomatic relations and the exchange of Ambassadors and Ministers with a Government does not imply any judgment upon the domestic policy of that Government,

The Specialized Agencies of the United Nations are technical and largely non-