

Protarchus, though it was with difficulty that he was brought to concede the point, does at last grant in a sort of way that it may be so; and asks,—“Well, what then?” The answer of Socrates (ὅτι προσαγορεύεις κ. τ. λ.) is in substance:—The admission made has a direct bearing on the question in dispute. For, you call pleasures, which are dissimilar from one another, by a different name (ἐτέρω ὀνοματι) from pleasure, namely, by the name *good* (λέγεις γὰρ ἀγαθὰ παντ’ εἶναι τὰ ἡδέα). Now, had you confined yourself to the single name *pleasure*, you would have been in no difficulty; since, dissimilar as pleasures are, no one can deny that they are all pleasures (το μὲν οὖν μὴ οὐχ ἡδέα εἶναι τὰ ἡδέα λόγος οὐδεὶς ἀμφισβητεῖ). But when, though you do not go so far as I do in saying that the mass of pleasures are evil and that some only are good, you acknowledge pleasures to be dissimilar, and nevertheless call them all by this other name of *good* (κακὰ δ’ οὗτ’ αὐτῶν τὰ πολλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ δέ, ὥς ἡμεῖς φάμεν, ὅμως πάντα σὺ προσαγορεύεις ἀγαθὰ αὐτὰ, ὁμολογῶν ἄνομοια εἶναι, τῷ λόγῳ εἰ τις σε προσαναγκάζοι), you are bound to shew what that is, common to all pleasures, the bad and the good (as I term them) alike, which you express by the term *good* (τί οὖν δὴ ταῦτον ἐν ταῖς κακαῖς ὁμοίως καὶ ἐν ἀγαθαῖς ἓν ὄν πασας ἡδονὰς ἀγαθὸν εἶναι προσαγορεύεις).—Here Protarchus, blinking the real point of his opponent’s argument, and seizing hold of the incidental circumstance that Socrates had stated some pleasures to be good and others bad, asks how Socrates could expect him, or any one who had defined pleasure to be *the good*, to admit that any pleasure can be bad (πῶς λέγεις, ὦ Σωκράτης; οἶει γὰρ τίνα κ. τ. λ.). Of course, this πῶς λέγεις of Protarchus was merely a trick of fence; for Socrates had himself indicated that he did not expect Protarchus to agree with him in describing certain pleasures as bad (ὥς ἡμεῖς φάμεν contrasted with σὺ προσαγορεύεις), nor had he founded his argument upon the idea that pleasures are some good and others bad, but only on the admitted fact that they are dissimilar. The response is therefore directly given: ἀλλ’ οὖν ἄνομους γε φήσεις αὐτὰς ἀλλήλαις εἶναι καὶ τίνας ἐναντίας.

The above explanation will shew how utterly at sea Stallbaum is in his criticism. “*Seriem disputationis*,” he says, “*si spectamus, sensus requiritur hic: id certe efficitur, voluptates non esse communi boni nomine appellandas, ut quae saepe numero etiam malae sint. Quod quum verbis non inesse videtur, varias tantarum emendationes viri docti.*” That the *series disputationis* would lead us to expect any