

besides being prepared to swim with the tide, it is essential that he should be willing to give and take almost any amount of abuse in reference to both public and private matters; and that he should not be very chary in promising support to local jobs, or in spending money to procure the support of such 'free and enlightened electors' as value their votes just in proportion to the dollars which they will command. Across the line, the influence of these causes has ended in leading respectable men to abandon politics, and in making the name 'politician' almost a term of reproach. Like causes will produce like effects in Canada, if they should be allowed free play. If patriotism, wisdom, and uprightness are at a discount at the polls, so will they be in the House. Can anybody in his senses suppose that a process of election such as that already described, carried on by an electorate almost co-extensive with manhood suffrage, in which men of ignorance and intelligence, of industry and of idleness, of vice and of virtue, all stand on a footing of absolute equality, will give us a Legislature in which the action of members is likely, in face of increasing temptations, to be swayed by motives of patriotism, intelligence, wisdom, and uprightness? It may do so when a clean thing can proceed out of an unclean, but not before.

The chief cause of the prevalence of these evils is to be found in the system of the election of representatives by local majorities. It is, indeed, true that when constituencies vary in size and character; when the franchise is confined to the more intelligent classes of the community, and when the great majority of the representatives consist of men of wealth who have sought election chiefly for the honour which it brings, the system may result in the formation of a very good legislature, as has been the case in England, though even there its evils are being rapidly developed, in proportion as numbers are being taken for the basis of representation. The system, however, must always be pernicious; and without safeguards similar to those formerly existing in England, can scarcely fail ultimately to induce political demoralization. The reason is that it forces both electors and representatives to act under conditions most unfavourable to the dis-

play of whatever amount of political virtue they may possess. It limits the electors' field of choice to two candidates, and thus forces non-partisan electors to accept one of two men both of whom they may dislike; while it compels partisans to vote for one who may stand much lower in their estimation than many of the candidates in neighbouring constituencies, and thus deteriorates the character of the House, and keeps highly popular men out of it. If anybody should doubt the correctness of these views, I would invite him to consider the cases of East Toronto in 1874, where Conservatives were not much enamoured of Mr. Coatsworth or Grits of Mr. O'Donohoe; of Messrs. Brown, Dorion, Drummond, Thibaudeau, and Laberge defeated in 1861; of Mr. Brown again defeated in 1866; of Sir George Cartier and Sir Francis Hincks defeated in 1872; of the general defeat of Conservative leaders, and of Sir John A. Macdonald's narrow escape from a like fate in 1874; *although in all these latter cases there can be no doubt that from one-tenth to one-half of the electors desired to have these leading men in the House and would have voted for them had they been at liberty to make a choice from the whole list of candidates.* Then, when the elector has decided for which of the two candidates he shall vote, the system renders it impossible for him to return the man of his choice otherwise than by defeating one whom his neighbours prefer to him. It thus induces the subordination of merit to popularity in the election of candidates, and the electioneering strife, with all its attendant evils, which revelations before our courts of law are proving to be by no means small; and it augments partyism both in the electorate and in the House. And finally, when the return has been made, it stultifies the votes of almost one-half of the constituency, and thus fails to secure a fair representation even of political parties—much less of national classes, interests, intelligence, or morals—in the House. Experience, on both sides of the line, proves its defectiveness in this particular most conclusively. In the States we find 92,798 electors of Maryland in 1868 polling 62,356 votes for Democratic, and 30,442 for Republican candidates. The total number of members to be elected was 111. Consequently a representation of each party