

Judge-advocate of corps.  
 First division, lieutenant-general—major of general staff; one captain and one lieutenant of infantry, aides; intendant of division; judge-advocate.

First brigade, major-general—aide-de-camp, first lieutenant of infantry; first regiment of infantry; second regiment of infantry; fusilier regiment

Second brigade, major-general—aide-de-camp, first lieutenant of infantry; third regiment of infantry; fourth regiment of infantry.

Artillery, major—battery four pound pieces; battery eight-pound pieces.

Regiment of cavalry.  
 Second division, lieutenant-general—major of general staff; one captain and one lieutenant of infantry, aides; intendant of division; judge-advocate.

Third brigade, major-general—aide-de-camp, first lieutenant of infantry; fifth regiment of infantry; battalion sharpshooters.

Fourth brigade, major-general—aide-de-camp, first lieutenant of infantry; seventh regiment of infantry; eighth regiment of infantry.

Artillery, major—battery four-pound pieces; battery eight-pound pieces.

Regiment of cavalry.  
 Cavalry division, lieutenant-general—major of general staff; one captain and one lieutenant of cavalry, aides; intendant of division; judge-advocate.

First brigade, major-general—first lieutenant of cavalry, aide-de-camp; three regiments of cavalry.

Second brigade, major-general—first lieutenant of cavalry, aide-de-camp; three regiments of cavalry.

Artillery, major—two batteries horse artillery.

Reserve artillery—colonel commanding field artillery regiment, commanding; two lieutenants of artillery, aides (in regard to all administrative objects considered as the fourth division of corps); intendants of division; judge-advocate; four batteries four pound pieces; four batteries eight pound pieces; four batteries horse artillery; engineer battalion; pontoon train; ammunition train.

RECAPITULATION.

	Batts.	Squads.	Guns.	Men.
First division of infantry	15	4	12	15,760
Second division of infantry	13	4	12	13,760
Cavalry division	—	—	8	5,720
Reserve artillery, etc.	1	—	61	1,880
Total, army corps	28	32	89	35,120

TRAINS.

- Train battalion, major.
- Three reserve ammunition trains.
- Five provision trains.
- One main hospital and four flying hospitals.
- One field treasury.
- One field post.
- One field railroad detachment.
- One field telegraph detachment.

DEPOT TROOPS.

Nine battalions, 1200 men each	10,800
One company of sharpshooters	250
Eight squadrons of cavalry, 200 horses each	1,600
Three batteries of artillery	220
Total	12,870

LANDWEHR.

Twenty-seven battalions, 800 men each	21,600
Thirty-two squadrons of cavalry, 100 horses each	3,200
Total	24,800

Artillery, engineers, and sharpshooters—Landwehr men—fortress (or heavy) artillery regiments, are not counted here. We cannot warrant at present the strict correctness of all these numbers. There are besides

slight differences between the corps; for instance, the Twelfth army corps (Saxony and Hesse) is somewhat stronger and differently composed. The corps of guards has one additional battalion sharpshooters, and several other corps, I think have no fusilier regiment; but the numbers adduced are near enough to arrive at a rather correct total; Field army in thirteen army corps, 456,560; depot troops, 167,310; Landwehr, 332,800; total, 956,770, or 377 battalions, 416 squadrons, 1,248 field pieces.

The field army is at present altogether in France, and certainly in this strength, as the depot battalions must have completed their ranks by November 1st. How many divisions of Landwehr have crossed the frontier must be ascertained at present.

Brigades and divisions of Landwehr are formed when they start. In regard to the field army, it ought to be remarked that the mobilization is merely an expansion; the bodies of troops, commanders, etc., remain the same as in peace. As few changes as possible is the rule.

That the armies of South Germany are not included in this count need not be mentioned. Bavaria has furnished two field and one reserve corps; Wurtemberg and Baden have furnished one small corps of about 20,000 each. Their organization is not yet quite carried out on the Prussian system, though the main points of the system have been adopted since 1866.

X—CLOSING REMARKS ABOUT THE SYSTEM.

The Prussian or North German army cannot, in the usual sense of the word, be called a "standing army." It is a great national military training school, in which the teachers alone—a part of the officers and non-commissioned officers—are permanent. The organization combines a system of militia with the strictness of training which makes the militia in fact an army.

The Prussian army is not by any means an instrument for the use of any monarch who should be inclined to make wars for the purpose of gratifying personal ambition or lust of conquest. It is not an instrument either to support tyranny and usurpation of constitutional rights. How could an army of 200,000 men compel the 250,000 reserves to put in an appearance if they would not? Single or local cases of disobedience could be disposed of and punished, but a general disposition to disobey would have a natural momentum not to be overcome.

It is not undeniable that this system of national defence is rather exacting and burdensome to the nation; but, strange to see, the Prussian nation has, in spite of it, kept well up with the progress of her neighbors in industry, commerce, husbandry and science. The expenses are great, but the finances of Prussia are in a better condition than those of any other European nation. The amount of money spent for the national defence, compared with the total revenues, is smaller in proportion than in the budget of France, Austria, or Russia, and the amount of taxes paid per head is smaller than in most other European States. Neither have any other important institutions been neglected on account of the army; especially public education has not suffered. It must even be admitted that the system can hardly be maintained except by a nation in which education is so general as in Prussia. That Prussia's neighbors will try to imitate her system closely seems probable, but the backwardness of general education will be a stumbling-block to several of them in an attempt to do so.

Political economists complain that the productive labor of 200,000 men every year is lost in Prussia—that the increase of public wealth could be so much greater. It might be possible to teach a man the technical business of a soldier in three months; but discipline, habits of obedience, of frugality, of endurance, cannot be taught in that time. And then, in times when the political aspect in Europe seems to permit it, a reduction of the term of service could take place, and the efforts of the Prussian officers would manage to maintain the present standard of efficiency with two years' service. This has taken place before now. During the years of peace after 1815, when exhausted Europe was recovering from the devastation brought about by Napoleon I., a period without any wars between any of the great powers, the term of service in Prussia was reduced to two, even to one and a half years; and this will certainly be done again as soon as the position acquired by Germany now will permit to do it with something like safety.

Finally, the Prussian nation does not consider the accumulation of wealth as the first and only purpose of life. To be able to defend home and property is considered at least just as desirable as to make money, and a hard experience has taught the German nation how desirable it is. If you have neighbours around you who want what you have, and who are always ready to ask, you must be prepared to hold your own. It is not even the ambition of rulers alone which threatens war; nations may do wrong just as well as rulers. It was not King George alone who wronged the American colonies; it was the English Parliament, backed by a majority of the nation, which refused redress. It was not Napoleon alone who made the present war; the majority of the French nation applauded his action. A general republic in Europe, of which some people dream nowadays, would not prevent war in Europe. We have seen even here how troublesome it was to beat reason into the heads of a considerable minority of one nation. Armies for executing the will of the majority would have to be called out in republican Europe as often as nations go to war now. The necessity of being prepared is obvious in Europe, and to be well prepared is cheaper in the long run. Any parallel between Europe and the United States is out of place. We are in the happy condition of having no neighbor on the continent which is our peer in power. Nobody could attack us with any reasonable chance of success, much less surprise us; a position which to a certain though much smaller degree is enjoyed by England too, on account of her insular position. But the continental nations are not so fortunate; they must live beside each other, and war will come unless human nature is changed altogether.

The Prussian nation has had a historical mission, to unite and reorganize Germany—a mission now on the verge of fulfilment. The system of national defence, commonly called the Prussian army, has been the main instrument to achieve the present unity of Germany, and it will be by means of this system that Germany will maintain it. Most probably Germany's present position will produce in Europe more of a tendency towards peace than towards war.

Prussia is indebted to her kings for the introduction, preservation, and improvement of this system; and the loyalty of the nation towards the house of Hohenzollern, much greater, by the by, than it is here usually admitted to be, is well deserved.