LORD BOWEN AND AUTHORSHIP.—*A propos* of Lord Bowen, says the *Law Journal*, it is a curious thing that he should never have written a law-book. He had the literary faculty strong in him. He had scholarship, culture, and learning. Who could have been better qualified to illuminate some branch of English law? But the desire of attaining immortality in that way seemed to him a 'doubtful passion.' 'You write a history of law or a treatise about it, and then a puff of reform comes and alters it all, and makes your history or treatise useless.' But is not this desponding philosophy just as true of the writing of books on any progressive science? The historian formulates his theory, say, of the early history of Rome. New records come to light, and the theory has to be reconstructed. A philosopher like Locke gives us a theory about the human mind. Later psychology upsets it, but would we wish the "Essay on the Human Understanding" unwritten? Blackstone's work, as Sir Frederick Pollock says, must be done over again, in the light of the records which the Selden Society is producing and of comparative jurisprudence, but have those splendid "Commentaries" been written in vain; or is "Ancient Law" less an epoch-making book because Sir Henry Maine's conclusions may not be final? No! the work of Niebuhr and Locke and Blackstone and Maine has served its purpose in systematising by their generalisations all the knowledge that was available at their respective periods. They have made the work which supersedes them possible. The only true immortality belongs to poets—and law reporters.

CONTEMPT OF COURT.—In *Seaward* v. *Paterson*, the Court of Appeal, in affirming the decision of Mr. Justice North committing a man to prison for contempt of Court by disobeying an injunction, have in appearance somewhat enlarged the law as to contempt. The injunction forbade the continuance by Paterson, his servants and agents, of certain glove fights at the Queensberry Club, which had been adjudged to be a private nuisance (cf. *The Pelican Club Case* (1890), 7 Times L.R. 135). One Murray, not a party to the action, but having notice of the injunction, continued the nuisance, and the result of his so doing has been a decision that any person aiding and abetting disobedience to an injunction of which he has notice, whether he is or is not a party to the action in which it is granted, and whether he is or is not a servant or agent of the party enjoined,