

over the Government, and of the power of effectually stopping the supplies, should the proceedings of the Executive Government be unsatisfactory. If the parallel could be drawn between the power of the House of Commons to stop the supplies, and that possessed in the Colony if there were no civil list provided, the same arguments would hold good in one country that have been maintained in the other,—but let us examine the question.

In the states of Europe after the feudal system was introduced, the King was but a kind of President amongst the nobility, as Lord Paramount, under whom all estates were held; some upon condition that the tenant should serve for a certain time in the wars of the King, others upon conditions of a different nature, but still intended to support the royal power and dignity. The King also possessed himself large domains, of which the profits went into the royal exchequer, and it was with his own revenue that the King carried on the Government, and supported the national expenditure. In process of time, however, improvements in the art of war made it necessary that standing armies and navies should be provided, in lieu of the military service due from the landholders as the King's tenants; and then came taxation of the corporate towns, and of the Clergy, at first asked in the shape of free gifts. For the purpose of obtaining these gifts, the commonalty of the country were required by the King to send their delegates to meet the nobles of the land in parliament, when the necessities of the nation were laid before them, and the Sovereign asked at the hands of his faithful commons aid in the peculiar emergency of the kingdom. When this was granted, he thanked them (in the form which is still preserved,) for their benevolence, and accepted the grant as a free gift. This course gradually erected the House of Commons, composed originally not of the nobility, who had a right to sit in Parliament, or to make laws, but of those who having no such right, according to the then Constitution of the realm, gradually acquired it by degrees, in proportion as the necessities of the Sovereign enabled them to annex conditions to their grants of money, and to insist upon certain immunities being conceded in return for their grants.

The grants of money made by the Commons were always for some extraordinary purposes,

most generally for that of national defence; but the King paid his own officers of government out of his own hereditary revenues, at his own pleasure. It was not until a very late period in English history, that, in consideration of the surrender by the King of his own hereditary revenue during his life, he was granted by Parliament, for the same term, a sufficient sum to pay the civil list,—i.e. the ordinary expenses of his household and Government.

But it was not through means of this civil expenditure that the Commons of England acquired their power, uncontrolled and unlimited as it has become. On the contrary, it was because the money which they possessed was necessary for the national preservation, and the Sovereign without the aid of the Commons for the support of his fleets and armies, became powerless as a private individual.—In England, the paltry system of making the revenues of necessary officers of the Government precarious, and subject to yearly vote, was never adopted; but the Commons had the real efficient check upon the Executive, through their appropriation of money for national purposes of strength and defence, and they have continued to be yearly appropriated to the present day; so that the House of Commons, although they cannot require the dismissal of the advisers of the Crown, can render it wholly impossible for them to carry on public business, by denying them the means even of defending the Kingdom.

But the defence and preservation of this Province does not depend upon resources derived from its people; nor are the people ready or able to take this burden upon themselves. They belong to a great Empire, and are liable to the enmity of great nations, against whom, with their own resources, they cannot contend; and therefore they cannot have the same power of actually enforcing their opinions against the Government. Their power lies in a different source, and only there: namely, in the extreme resort of physical resistance, in their power of opposing oppression, should it be attempted, with the strong hand, or of calling in the aid of foreign nations, and subjecting themselves to the power of a foreign people.—Even these extremes have been weakly and criminally resorted to, happily in vain. But reformers should deeply consider the question, and see once for all, that, failing the moral