

BELGIUM AND GREECE

State could with so good a cause summon to her assistance a pledged ally.

For, let it be noted, Greece was the only State by means of which the necessary help could be given. The Treaty of London, which in this matter had been confirmed by the Treaty of Bucharest, had denied to Serbia access to the sea. She was thereby shut off from free intercourse with the other States of Europe. She had great and powerful allies—Russia, France, Great Britain—but such was the unfortunate geographical position of the kingdom that scarcely a single soldier, much less an organised expedition, could find his way to the threatened territory, except over the soil of Greece. It was this condition against which the Serbian nation and the Serbian statesmen had struggled, and justly struggled, in the discussions which followed the first Balkan war, for they had seen quite clearly that a Serbia which had no access to the sea would be still a Serbia subject to the caprices or the ambitions of Austria. One safeguard alone there was, and that was the alliance with Greece, for the alliance with Greece opened up the single railway by which there was connection with the sea and a great port.

And this brings us to a matter which is very pertinent to the whole question. It is customary for German writers, in comparing the German action in Belgium and the Allied action in Greece, to assert that the Germans were under the domination of what they called "*Not*," or necessity. They were driven, so they declare, under the paramount requirements of defending their national existence, to acts which