

igned form by developed countries in a United Nations General Assembly whose rules of procedure were drawn up long before most non-aligned countries achieved independence. Developing countries saw progressive and collective action in the General Assembly as one of the few ways open to them to press the industrialized world towards reform of the international economic system. In their view, the developed countries that were in a position to take effective action, both in the realm of international peace and security and on economic issues, had often failed to act to solve global problems through the UN in accordance with the principles and objectives of the Charter. Instead, they had resorted to more specifically-oriented institutions and arrangements that suited them better (CCD, IMF, IBRD, GATT) on major current issues. Even the Security Council was viewed with misgiving because of the veto power retained by its permanent members. The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. appeared to third World delegates to act broadly in concert to determine the fate of the Middle East in the light of considerations of strategic advantages, oil and domestic

politics. It is thus predictable that Third World countries will tend to band together at the UN General Assembly, where their collective force may be felt at least to a greater extent than in other multilateral contexts.

As an aside, it cannot be said that up to 1976 the Soviet bloc enjoyed many concrete and identifiable successes. Voting scrupulously as always with the non-aligned on all political issues with anti-colonial connotations but clearly situated in the "industrialized" camp on many economic questions, the Soviet bloc tended largely to be taken for granted as totally predictable, if not positively ignored, by the very Third World representatives whose favour they vigorously sought.

In the face of Third World solidarity on UN General Assembly proceedings and decisions, Canadian and other Western delegations began to find themselves for the most part in a defensive stance. With few exceptions, they were reacting to non-aligned initiatives, seeking, at best, to modify draft resolutions so as to render the consequences of their inevitable adoption less unpalatable, and, at worst, to

as observers, together with three countries and four international organizations as "guests". Issued economic and political declarations, a declaration on national liberation, an action program for economic co-operation, 16 political and six economic resolutions.

1974 *March*. Second ministerial meeting of the Co-ordinating Bureau, Algiers (first Bureau meeting followed Algiers summit meeting, 1973). Attended by foreign ministers of the 17 Bureau countries and 23 observers.

1975 *February*. Conference of developing countries on raw materials, Dakar, Senegal. Stemmed from the 1973 Algiers summit meeting, but nominally open to all developing countries; of the 110 invited, 57 non-aligned and ten other developing countries attended (only 15 represented at ministerial level), together with observers.

Issued the "Dakar Declaration", an action program and 19 resolutions, none on political issues.

*March*. Third ministerial meeting of Co-ordinating Bureau, Havana. Attended by foreign ministers of the 17 Bureau countries and 24 observers.

*August*. Fifth meeting of foreign ministers, Lima. Attended by 82 full members - North Vietnam, North Korea, Panama and the Palestine Liberation Organization joined; Mozambique and South Vietnam were elevated to full membership; South Korea's application was rejected.

1976 *May*. Fourth meeting of Co-ordinating Bureau, Algiers. Attended by foreign ministers of the 17 Bureau countries and observers for 29 countries and organizations. Angola, Comores and Seychelles accepted as full members.

*July*. Information ministers' meeting, New Delhi.

*August*. Foreign ministers' meeting, Colombo, followed by fifth conference of heads of state or government, Colombo. Membership raised to 86.