

and confidence based on substantive progress in the settlement of disputes is allowed to develop.

### Soviet Union Proposals

Commenting on views advanced by the Soviet Union at the Sub-Committee discussions, Mr. Martin said:

The Soviet proposals represent on their face a shift in previous Soviet positions which had long emphasized the nuclear aspect and the importance of nuclear prohibitions. For the first time the Soviet proposals insofar as they relate to the general problem of disarmament made almost no mention of control in the nuclear field, but were restricted to far-reaching measures of conventional disarmament to be carried out virtually on an automatic basis between 1956 and 1958.

To a certain extent the Soviet proposals represent a step forward insofar as their acceptance of certain limited control procedures is concerned. I do not minimize the importance of this; I welcome it. But they contain a number of basic weaknesses which make them unacceptable, in our view, as a basis for general agreement:

(1) Parts I and II of the proposals divorce measures of conventional disarmament from measures of nuclear disarmament and contain no provision even for a beginning in the nuclear field. To proceed in this manner would serve only to accelerate the nuclear arms race and cause more and more states to join in it.

(2) On the question of force levels, they proposed the figures of 1 to 1.5 million for the United States, the Soviet Union and China, and 650,000 for the United Kingdom and France. According to the Soviet plan, these levels would be reached by 1958 without regard to whether or not a reduction in international tension had been achieved through political settlements. The Soviets claim to have accepted proposals of the Western Powers in putting forward these levels and superficially this appears to be so. However, when the earlier Anglo-French proposal for fixing numerical ceilings for all armed forces was originally advanced, it was intended that these levels should be the ultimate agreed objectives to be reached by *successive stages* allowing for the growth of confidence and parallel political settlements; for *effective nuclear prohibitions and controls*; the whole being arranged in a *comprehensive* disarmament programme. This is a vastly different proposition from the Soviet use of the figures in a plan limited to a single phase having no nuclear control provisions nor any provisions for beginning upon nuclear disarmament. It is vastly different from the proposal that these reductions be carried out without regard to the international situation.

(3) The Soviet proposals are contained in four sections. Sections I and II deal with what might be described as general conventional disarmament. Sections III and IV, however, which according to the Soviet delegation may be considered separately from the first two sections, and are described as representing "desirable" steps, contain proposals which have important and wholly unacceptable implications. The Soviet plan in these latter sections contains a number of elements which would have the effect of crippling NATO forces in Western Europe, denying atomic weapons to any forces stationed in Germany and placing a tight rein on German rearmament. The proposal set forth in Section III for a zone of limitation and inspection of armaments to be established in Europe, including territory of "both parts" of Germany and states adjacent to them, is yet an-