

10. We must recognize the reality of some, at least, of these difficulties. They are not on the other hand valid in the case of Canada and several other United Nations. It is even open to question whether an armistice in this form would legally bring about a cessation of hostilities between Canada and Germany.

11. It is suggested that a means might be found out of this difficulty which would be in accord with the proposals made not long ago to Mr. Churchill and President Roosevelt for the formal recognition of the authority of the Supreme Allied Commanders by the Governments providing forces to serve under their command. This matter, indeed, would furnish a good reason for clearing up in a formal manner the position in which we and other Allied countries have arrived. We might, therefore, suggest immediately to the United Kingdom Government that we could accept, in place of the formula proposed by the European Advisory Commission, the conclusion of the armistice in the name of the Supreme Commander of the forces of the U.S.S.R. and of the Supreme Allied Commander or Commanders of the forces of the other United Nations. General Eisenhower (and perhaps General Wilson if he were associated in the signature) could then sign "on behalf of the United Nations" in the course of the exercise of their commands and reference to the Governments of the United Nations could be avoided. It would be necessary, also, to rewrite Article 12(a) of the Draft Instrument.

12. This matter, formal though it may appear to be, concerns the fundamental nature of the alliance against Germany and the relationship of the three Great Powers to all the other partners in the alliance.

*Decided  
at Washington  
with reference  
to above  
14-6-44  
A  
Noted*