

issues inherent in the situation existing in 1956, Israel had made a decision to invoke its "sovereign rights of self-defence".

(b) The following is an English translation of the terms in which the Prime Minister of Israel stated these objectives in speaking in the Knesset, the Parliament of Israel, on November 8, 1956: "We set ourselves three main roles in the Sinai operation—(i) the destruction of the forces which lay in wait to destroy us; (ii) the liberation of the territory of the homeland which had been occupied by the invader (this was a reference to the occupation of the Gaza strip); and (iii) the safeguarding of free navigation in the Gulf of Eilat (the Gulf of Aqaba) and the Suez Canal."

6. (a) No.

(b) The Gaza strip was a small part of the area which the United Nations General Assembly recommended for inclusion in the Arab state in its partition resolution of November 29, 1947. When the British mandate ended in mid-May 1948 Egyptian forces occupied the Gaza strip and territory beyond it and in the course of the 1948 hostilities received some 200,000 Arab refugees from other areas seeking asylum behind the Egyptian lines. When the Egyptians were forced back (see 2 (a) above) fighting with Israelis occurred in this small area, but under Article VI: 3 of the armistice agreement of February 24, 1949 all Israeli military forces were to be withdrawn from the Gaza strip, which was to remain under Egyptian military control pending a peace settlement.

(c) In comparing the two situations the following points should be borne in mind: (i) the Gaza strip is less than 30 miles long and about six miles wide; (ii) its inhabitants are not Egyptians but Palestinian Arabs; (iii) Egypt has not annexed the Gaza strip but has been administering it on behalf of the Palestinian Arabs pending a peace settlement; (iv) in the peace settlement "the rights, claims and positions of either party" are not to be prejudiced "in any way" by the present location of the armistice demarcation line or by any other provision of the armistice agreement (see Article XI, section 2(b) above).

7. (a) On February 2, 1957, the General Assembly adopted a resolution "recognizing that withdrawal by Israel must be followed by action which would assure progress towards the creation of peaceful conditions" in the area. This resolution went on to request the Secretary-General, in consultation with the parties concerned, to carry out various measures either specifically enunciated in the resolution or defined therein by reference to previous reports of the Secretary-General which had been approved by the Assembly.

The Secretary-General has since been devoting his attention to the tasks assigned to him under the resolution. A fundamental responsibility, arising out of the General Assembly's exhortation to Egypt and Israel to observe scrupulously the 1949 Armistice Agreement, involves the implementation of the Assembly's directive that maintenance of the Agreement "requires the placing of the United Nations Emergency Force on the Egypt-Israel Armistice Demarcation Line." The Secretary-General also has been concentrating on working out special arrangements for the Gaza Strip, not only with regard to the interposition of UNEF between the armed forces of Egypt and Israel, but also for utilizing, in the Secretary-General's words, "the assistance of the United Nations and its appropriate auxiliary bodies . . . toward putting a definite end to all incursions and raids across the border from either side." The efforts of the Secretary-General to promote progress towards the creation of peaceful conditions are being actively supplemented by diplomatic efforts on the part of many governments interested in the welfare of the Middle East, including the Government of Canada.

(b) To secure and supervise the cease-fire in accordance with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly.

(c) The Secretary of State for External Affairs reviewed the question of consent to the presence of the United Nations Emergency Force in Egypt in a statement in the House of Commons on March 15, 1957, when he said:

"Last November 5, . . . the Egyptian Government formally conveyed to the Secretary-General explicit acceptance of the General Assembly resolution of that date, which established the United Nations Force to perform the tasks which I have already outlined. Egypt's acceptance of this resolution was a voluntary act, by which the Egyptian Government imposed on itself a qualification upon the exercise of its sovereignty.

"This decision was formally conveyed in an aide-memoire on the basis for the presence and functioning of UNEF in Egypt, an aide-memoire submitted to the General Assembly by the Secretary-General in his report on November 20, and subsequently noted with approval by the Assembly. In this aide-memoire, . . . the terms of which had been agreed between the Secretary-General and the Egyptian Government, the Government of Egypt declared:

'When exercising its sovereign rights on any matter concerning the presence and functioning of UNEF, it will be guided, in good faith, by its acceptance of the general resolution of November 5, 1956.'