

Non-Proliferation Treaty or otherwise accept international safeguards on their entire nuclear programme. It follows from this policy that Canada will terminate nuclear shipments to any non-nuclear weapon state which explodes a nuclear device.

This requirement is in addition to those outlined in December of 1974. The purpose of Canadian safeguards policy is simple and straightforward. We wish to avoid contributing to the proliferation of nuclear weapons while at the same time satisfying the legitimate requirements for uranium and technology of countries which demonstrate the intention of restricting Canadian assistance only to peaceful non-explosive uses. Nuclear export policy already requires binding assurances that what Canada provides will not be used for explosive purposes. Existing policy, however, does not cover what a country receives from other suppliers or what it might do on its own. The new policy will close this gap. We will have, therefore; assurance by treaty that Canada's nuclear customers will have been selected from amongst those countries which have made a clear and unequivocal commitment to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The development of the CANDU reactor has been one of Canada's great technological achievements. This technology is needed to reduce the world's dependence on oil. Moreover, our industrialized trading partners look to Canada as a source of uranium to fuel the nuclear reactor programmes which they, like ourselves, have undertaken to meet a growing share of energy needs. In the absence of alternative technologies, developing countries will also look to nuclear power once they have exploited