

3. Recommends that all members refrain from introducing military goods in the area of hostilities and in general refrain from any acts which would delay or prevent the implementation of this resolution;--

And finally:

--4. Urges that upon the cease-fire being effective steps be taken to reopen the Suez Canal and restore secure freedom of navigation; . . .

These functions as outlined by the Secretary-General in his report and based on the resolution of November 2 were approved by a resolution of the General Assembly of November 7; and that resolution reaffirms the necessity for a scrupulous observance of the Israeli-Egyptian armistice terms. That reaffirmation was given again by the Assembly in a resolution on February 2, passed by a vote of 56 to nothing, including the votes of the United Kingdom and the United States. This resolution of February 2, this reaffirmation of the scrupulous observance of the armistice terms, also included provisions that the United Nations Emergency Force was to be deployed on the Egyptian-Israeli demarcation line, and for the implementation of other measures included in the Secretary-General's report of a few weeks before, January 24, I think.

This report of January 24 by the Secretary-General, which was endorsed unanimously by the General Assembly and is binding on the Secretary-General because of that unanimous endorsement including the votes of the United Kingdom and the United States, emphasizes that there can be no change in the legal situation under the armistice agreement until the parties to that agreement accept such a change. This report states also that the General Assembly can only recommend; it cannot establish any United Nations administration of Gaza, and that that recommendation, to be effective, would require negotiations with Egypt. Now, there have been no further resolutions laying down the function to be performed by the Secretary-General in carrying out the earlier resolutions. Therefore, this one of February 2 is decisive in this connection.

Our own position in regard to this matter was made clear on February 26. At that time we took the position that an arrangement to follow the withdrawal of the Israeli forces should be spelled out in a resolution and not merely deduced from the Secretary-General's reports. We put out in considerable detail what we thought should be included in any such plan or resolution. It should include, first, observance of the armistice; second, deployment of United Nations Emergency Force in Gaza on both sides of the armistice line; third, there should be no interference with innocent passage through the Straits of Tiran pending determination of the legal position of those waters; fourth, we made certain proposals for Gaza. This is such an important point on the map at present that I should like to go into that matter,