

bilateral superpower relations is unlikely to emerge between the United States and the various regimes now possessing ballistic missiles.

- The proliferation genie is out of the bottle. To an alarming extent worldwide proliferation of missile technology, along with the proliferation of WMD, has already occurred, despite non-proliferation agreements such as the 1970 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), the 1987 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).

Missile defence, in other words, is considered by its enthusiasts to be a response to a security environment *already fundamentally altered* rather than a policy in anticipation of radical change.<sup>6</sup> The terrorist attacks on civilian and military targets in New York and Washington of September 11, 2001 vindicated rather than undermined this perception. While missile defences could not have prevented the attacks, their impact was to intensify the Bush administration's commitment to national security against a wide spectrum of threat, including missile attack. By linking NMD to homeland security, the Bush administration was able to secure \$7.8B in funding missile defence in the Senate's most recent defence authorization bill.<sup>7</sup>

It is important to note that U.S. determination to proceed with some form of missile defence has survived three administrations, Democratic and Republican, since President Reagan announced the Strategic Defense Initiative in 1983. It has now been given renewed vigor from a fourth. Missile defence has also acquired a constituency outside the United States. The U.K. Missile Proliferation Study Group chaired by Lord Chalfont stated that "the government has failed to find a response to the rapidly maturing missile threat to British centers of population"; their report criticized Britain's 1998 *Strategic Defense Review* for failing to take a more holistic view of the nation's sundry security interests and raised "serious questions about whether British intervention forces can ever be used against an enemy possessing missiles armed with WMD."<sup>8</sup> In the spring of 2001 Foreign Secretary Robin Cook defended his government's support for U.S. missile defence plans with the observation that the countries of greatest concern with regard to proliferation were already well out of step with the NPT regime. Secretary of Defence Geoff Hoon has since revealed that Blair government's thinking roughly parallels that of the Bush administration.<sup>9</sup>

Due to the comparatively high profile of NMD in the Bush administration's defence goals, it gets the lion's share of public attention and is most often the object of uninformed and contentious debate. However, theatre missile defence (TMD)<sup>10</sup> is in two respects more urgent and significant. First, it is in TMD that the available and emerging technologies approximate a practical answer to existing threats rather than a security vision for potential threats. Second, TMD may be critical to the viability of peace-support expeditionary missions the international community has taken on in the post-Cold War world for which American participation or support has been vital, because "U.S. foreign and national security policies in troubled regions will henceforth be hampered without missile defenses."<sup>11</sup> The NATO alliance's "southern strategy" in the Mediterranean could easily face threats from states in the "arc of crisis" running through the Middle East and Northern Africa.<sup>12</sup> Moreover, TMD represents the thin edge of the missile defence wedge, as the first tier of the "layered" missile defence architecture Washington is now pursuing.

## II The Symbiosis of Deterrence and Defence

That missile defense has the attention of the United States to a far greater extent than Washington's allies is a product of a half-century's strategic thinking about the peril of nuclear war between the superpowers. In the late 1960s and early 1970s Moscow and Washington