

standardized procedures so that human rights intelligence is easily collected, rapidly passed on and smoothly combined with other UN streams of information.

#### **RECOMMENDATION**

*Canada should encourage the UN Centre to bring together the various sectors or agencies of the UN that regularly mount field missions to discuss how the Centre can utilize their field presence. The objective would be to involve them in first line human rights monitoring upon which specialised human rights experts could take appropriate follow-up action. Together they should also design a common reporting procedure and form, and the Centre should offer to help in training where appropriate.*

This stream of information must go both ways, and this will be argued further on the section on advocacy. It appears quite obvious however advocacy apart, that there are many times when other operational arms of the UN could usefully factor in human rights intelligence into their operations both to protect their own staff and to increase the effectiveness of their particular mission. So far the Centre has not played this role, and Rwanda will provide a useful vehicle to examine what and how they could have proceeded.

#### **RECOMMENDATION**

*Canada should encourage the UN Centre for Human Rights to bring together its staff and relevant outside human rights NGOs, individuals, and appropriate UN agencies, to initiate an evaluation of how the Centre could have better monitored and informed other parts of the UN about the human rights implications leading up to and immediately after April 6th.*

The UN Centre for the foreseeable future must send much smaller human rights monitoring teams than they would wish in principle. This will allow them to insure that the team is composed of experienced human rights people who inherently understand the concept and objectives of missions and who can help to formulate and operationalize those conceptual and policy objectives as they go along. Each mission will help to incrementally create and add to the philosophical and policy basis for UN human rights missions.

Small teams are also more able to work as an operationally coherent team in a situation where operational guidelines are almost non-existent or far from adequate. As with policy, they will be incrementally developing operational procedures and knowledge which will provide the corporate memory and capacity to mount ever larger missions if and as needed in the future.

Finally, the smaller the teams the faster they can be deployed. Many situations will inherently be so transitory as to never lend themselves to large monitoring missions. However as the rapid deployment procedures of the Centre evolve, they will be able to move larger numbers of experienced monitors in rapidly and still be capable of providing them with sufficient resources and administrative backup.