

For the longer term future, technology constraints could work within an overarching regional arms control structure. The Sea Bed Treaty, for instance, has been signed by several Middle East states, but then they do not have the technology to deploy that category of weapon. Two other weapon categories, however, are of concern in regional security.

- (1) The anti-ship missile, some of which can be converted quite easily for a land attack role, has become the weapon of choice for most coastal defence naval forces. Traditionally, naval arms limitations have focused on platforms. Today, and the Middle East is a good example, constraints must be directed to the weapons, missiles in particular. Again, a broadly based multilateral agreement would be needed to control the spread of those weapons. Implementing controls of any form on these weapons would be extremely difficult and unlikely to succeed outside a more broadly-based arms control regime.
- (2) The other weapon that could eventually be considered for control measures is, of course, the sea mine. But the indiscriminate way in which both Iran and Iraq used mines in the Persian Gulf stands in testimony of the difficulty of imposing constraints on the use of these weapons. Warehouse inspection is probably the only way by which some measure of control could be imposed.

Tacit Measures

As already established, tacit measures form the basic foundation upon which a regime of mutual trust and thus greater stability can be built. In this regard, the maritime dimension of the Middle East is essentially a stable environment. The issue, therefore, is how to keep it stable and how to transfer this level of stability to other maritime activities in the region which do not presently enjoy it. One of the logical ways